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RACISM AND THE CONSTITUTION:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL FATE OF
BRITISH COLUMBIA ANTI-ASIAN
IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION,
1884-19090
By BRUCE

RYDER*

The author explores the values and forces that influenced judicial and
federal cabinet decisions regarding the constitutional validity of over one
hundred BC statutes discriminating against persons of the Japanese or
Chinese race passed between 1872 and 1922. He argues that the
interpretation of the constitutional division of powers was shaped by a
racist ideology that viewed Asian immigrants as different from, and
inferior to, European immigrants in all respects but one: their capacity
for work. In this, the first part of his study, he focuses on the nature of
the federal disallowance power and the reasons why it was used to veto
the BC ImmigrationActs that had the effect of prohibiting Chinese, and
later, Japanese immigration.

I. INTRODUCTION
This paper is the first part of a study of how the
constitutional allocation of legislative and executive power shaped
the legal treatment of Chinese and Japanese people in British
Columbia from 1872 to 1922. A racist theory and practice,
rationalized by a belief in the natural superiority of the caucasian
race, was deeply entrenched in the law, culture and institutions of
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the province. Over this period, the Bc legislature passed over one
hundred acts or bills containing provisions discriminating explicitly
against persons of the Chinese or Japanese race.1 In exploring the
constitutional fate of BC anti-Asian legislation, one must look both
at court decisions and at the use of the Dominion powers of
reservation and disallowance. Many of these laws were challenged
in the courts and six were declared ultra vires on the grounds that
they were beyond the constitutional powers of a provincial
legislature. On three occasions, the Lieutenant-Governor of BC
reserved assent to anti-Asian Bills and thereby prevented them from
coming into force. The use of the federal disallowance power
imposed more serious constraints on the legislative expression of
racism in BC: between 1878 and 1921, the federal cabinet invoked
the disallowance power on twenty-two occasions to veto BC antiAsian legislation. Indeed, given the importance that disallowance
played in this context, much of this paper is focused on discovering
the factors which motivated resort to that extraordinary federal
2
power.
To do so, I have examined the occasions on which federal
officials refused to intervene as well as the occasions on which they
did take action against Bc anti-Asian legislation. As Mallory pointed
out in his study of the disallowance power in a different context,
"[A]n examination of the petitions that went unheeded would be

1 1 want to emphasize that the legal discrimination was on the grounds of race, as
opposed to national origin or citizenship. The legislation operated equally against all Asian
residents of British Columbia, whether they were aliens, naturalized subjects or natural-born
British subjects. Typically, legislation defined Chinese (Japanese) as "any native of the
Chinese (Japanese) Empire or its dependencies not born of British parents, and shall include
any person of the Chinese (Japanese) race" See, for example, ProvincialElectionsAct, S.B.C.
1903-5, e. 17, s. 3. As Martin J.commented after surveying a range of anti-Chinese statutes
in Re Coal Mines Regulation Act (1904), 10 B.C.R. 408 (B.C.S.C.) at 426: 'These Acts show
a very remarkable adherence by the Legislature to the view that the Chinese are objected to
not so much on the ground of nationality as on that of race."
2 This study covers the period from 1872 to 1922 because it was during this period that
BC passed explicitly anti-Asian laws that were considered for federal disallowance. By the
1920s, new instances of legal discrimination tended to be expressed in less visible forms of
delegated and discretionary decision-making. Simultaneously, disallowance had lost much of
the fragile political legitimacy it once had. Thereafter, attempts at federal control of
provincial policies had to be more subtle than the crude form of dominance allowed by the
disallowance power. In other words, this study is framed by the distinct legal forms of racism
and federal control in the first fifty years of BC's provincial history.
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more illuminating than a consideration of those that were acted
upon."3 If attention was given solely to those occasions on which BC
anti-Asian legislation was disallowed, one could form the impression,
understandably, that the federal government fought a battle against
the entrenchment of racist policies in the law. However, this would
be a serious mistake; the federal government refused to veto a wide
range of BC anti-Asian legislation and itself adopted explicitly racist
legal policies in such areas as immigration and the right to vote
throughout the period under study. By placing the use of the
disallowance power in the larger context of Dominion and BC
immigration and labour policies, it becomes apparent that the
Dominion vetoed BC anti-Asian legislation only when it felt it
necessary to protect its conception of Dominion or Imperial
economic or strategic interests.
Both federal and provincial politicians subscribed to a racist
ideology that stressed the inherent, natural superiority of European
(white)4 people over non-European people. Legislation ensured
that elected officials were exclusively white male British subjects who
were accountable to an electorate composed, equally exclusively, of
their own gender and race.5 That Canada should be a nation
dominated by the white races of Europe was an assumption shared
by all men with political power in the late nineteenth and early
3 J.R. Mallory, Social Credit and the FederalPower in Canada (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1976) at 178.
4 I will use the terms "European," "Euro-Canadian," or "whites" to refer to the caucasian

population of British Columbia. Of course, many white residents of British Columbia were
born in Canada, the United States or some other non-European nation. Similarly, Asian
residents of British Columbia were of diverse (including Canadian) national origin. However,
British Columbia's anti-Asian laws were based explicitly on race, regardless of national origin.
They affected persons of actual or perceived Asian descent who were aliens, naturalized
subjects or natural-born British subjects equally. I will use the terms Asian and European to
designate race rather than nationality, since this usage most accurately reflects the social and
economic racial hierarchy in the province.
5 Legislation typically gave male British subjects the right to vote or hold public office,
and then set out exclusions for "Indians," Japanese, Chinese, and "Hinds." See P. Roy,
"Citizens Without Votes: East Asians in British Columbia, 1872-1947" in J. Dahlie & T.
Fernando, eds, Ethnicity, Power andPolitics in Canada (Toronto: Methuen, 1981) at 151 and
B. Ryder, "Legislation Excluding Asians from the Franchise and the Right to Hold Public
Office" in Racism and the Constiatuion.. The Constitutional Fate of British Columbia AntiAsian Legislation, 1872-1922, c. 3, [Currently unpublished. A copy is on file in the library of
Osgoode Hall Law School].
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There was, however, profound disagreement

between the Dominion and BC governments about the politically
appropriate response to Asian immigration and employment. These
disagreements were based on different class-based assessments of the
short-term 6 value of the availability of Asian workers in the
province. For the white working men of BC, who believed that
Asian workers threatened their interests, Asian immigrants were
different from and inferior to Europeans in all respects and thus
ought to be excluded from the province. For the white capitalist
class, Asians were an efficient and relatively cheap source of labour.
These disagreements, regarding the definition of racial difference,
played out in the BC legislature whenever the passage of anti-Asian
immigration and labour legislation was debated. And whenever antiAsian legislation was passed by the BC legislature, the debates
between Euro-Canadian men, divided by class interests, over the
definition of racial difference continued at the level of federalprovincial politics. In contrast to their counterparts in the BC
legislature, politicians at the federal level were less influenced by the
demands of the white working class of BC and far more influenced
by considerations such as the maintenance of an adequate labour
supply for large nation-building projects and the preservation of
diplomatic relations with Japan.
Within British Columbia, differences about the value of
Asian residents became a high profile staple of debates amongst
6 In the nineteenth century, Euro-Canadian politicians assumed that Chinese and
Japanese immigrants were "sojourners" who would voluntarily return to their country of origin:
A.B. Chan, "The Myth of the Chinese Sojourner in Canada" in G. Hirabayashi & K.V.
Ujimoto, eds, Vsible Minorities and Muficulturalism: Asians in Canada (Toronto:
Butterworths, 1980). A clear statement of this attitude is the following speech by Prime
Minister MacDonald defending the passage of legislation in 1885 depriving Chinese of the vote
in Dominion elections: 'The Chinese are foreigners. If they come to this country, after three
years' residence, they may, if they choose, be naturalized. But we still know that when the
Chinaman comes here he intends to return to his own country; he does not bring his family
with him; he is a stranger, a sojourner in a strange land, for his own purposes for a while; he
has no common interest with us, and while he gives us his labor and is paid for it, and is
valuable, the same as a threshing machine or any other agricultural implement which we may
borrow from the United States on hire and return it to the owner on the south side of the
line; a Chinaman gives us his labor and gets his money, but that money does not fructify in
Canada; he does not invest it here, but takes it with him and returns to China; and if he
cannot, his executors or his friends send his body back to the flowery land. But he has no
British instincts or British feelings or aspirations, and therefore ought not to have a vote."
Canada, .C Debates vol. 18 at 1582 (4 May 1885).
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voters and elected representatives 7 beginning with the rise of
industrial modes of production in the 1870s and continuing through
the period under study. On some occasions, politicians who
favoured the presence of Asian workers in the province as a source
of cheap labour prevailed in the legislature; on other occasions,
coinciding with the political influence of organized white labour,
those who favoured exclusionary policies were in the majority.
While the BC government's commitment to an anti-Asian
policy wavered over time depending on the political influence of the
Euro-Canadian working class, the Dominion government followed a
consistent policy of vetoing BC'S legislative prohibitions on Asian
immigration and on the employment of Asian labour. As a result,
conflict between Ottawa and Victoria over immigration and labour
policy was a constant feature of constitutional politics from the late
1870s until 1908. After 1908, provincial and federal policies
regarding Asian immigration were in harmony, the supply of
unskilled labour was more assured, and constitutional conflict over
the issue dissipated.
However, over the entire period under study, both levels of
government were content to enact or leave in place laws that
disenfranchised Asian people, or laws that in other ways contributed
to rendering Asian workers a relatively powerless and vulnerable
minority in the BC labour force. Judicial interpretation of the
constitutional division of powers followed the same pattern by
preventing the provinces from enacting legislation that interfered
with the right of Asians to reside in the province and work as wage
labourers, but otherwise, with minor exceptions, left discriminatory
legislation intact.
The history of racism in BC has been developed by a number
of scholars. Some have studied the destructive impact of the fur
trade, and later colonial expansion, settlement, and industrial

I will refer at times to "voters," or the "electorate," and to "politicians," or "elected
officials," rather than to the "public at large," so as not to obscure the monopolization of
political power in the hands of white male British subjects. Women, other than Asian and
First Nations' women, achieved the right to vote in 1917 (ProvincialElections Act Amendment
Act, S.B.C. 191718, c. 23), Chinese and South Asian men and women in 1947 (Provincial
ElectionsAct Amendment Act, S.B.C. 1947, c. 28, s. 14), and Japanese and First Nations men
and women in 1949 (ProvincialElections Act Amendment Act, S.B.C. 1949, c. 19, s. 3).

624

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[voL. 29 NO. 3

development on First Nations' cultures. 8 In addition, historians have
documented thoroughly the racist policies and practices encountered9
by Chinese and Japanese immigrants in British Columbia.
Moreover, valuable recent work has described the forms of
resistance and mobilization within Asian communities against
10
discriminatory laws and oppressive social and economic practices,
and the participation of Asian women in early economic
development in British Columbia. 11 These studies have shown that
class and racial inequality are dual products of colonialism and
capitalist development that combined to place Asian immigrants into
the lowest sectors of the British Columbia working class.

8 R.G. Bourgeault, "TheIndian, the M~tis and the Fur Trade" (1983) 12 Stud. Pol. Econ.
45; R. Warburton & S. Scott, "I'he Fur Trade and the Beginnings of Capitalism in British
Columbia" (1985) 5:1 Can. J. Native Stud. 27; Mackie, Colonial Land, Indian Labour and
Company Capital: The Economy of Vancouver Island, 1849-1958 (M.A. Thesis, University
of Victoria, 1984) [unpublished]; M. Kew, "Making Indians" in R. Warburton & D. Coburn,
eds, Workers, Capital and the State in British Columbia (Vancouver:. University of British
Columbia Press, 1988) 24.
9 See, especially, K. Adachi, The Enemy That Never Was: A History ofJapanese Canadians
(Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1976); S. Andracki, The Immigration of Orientals into
Canada, with Special Reference to Chinese (New York: Amo Press, 1978); A.B. Chan, Gold
Mountain: The Chinese in the New World (Vancouver: New Star Books, 1983); G. Creese,
"Class, Ethnicity and Conflict: The Case of Chinese and Japanese Immigrants, 1880-1923" in
Warburton & Coburn, ibid.; C.D. Lai, Chinatowns: Towns within Cities in Canada (Vancouver.
University of British Columbia Press, 1988); P. Li, The Chinese in Canada (Toronto: Oxford
University Press, 1988); P. Roy, A White Man's Province: British Columbia Politicians and
Chinese and Japanese Immigrants, 1858-1914 (Vancouver University of British Columbia
Press, 1989); P. Ward, White Canada Forever: PopularAttitudes and Public Policy Toward
Orientalsin British Columbia (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1978); E. Wickberg,
ed., From China to Canada: A History of the Chinese Communities in Canada (Toronto:
McClelland & Stewart, 1982); P.E. Wynne, Reaction to the Chinese in the PacificNorthwest and
British Columbia, 1850 to 1910 (New York. Amo Press, 1978).
10 Chan, supra, note 9; G. Creese, "Organizing Against Racism in the Workplace:
Chinese Workers in Vancouver Before the Second World War" (1987) 19:3 C.E.S. 35; Creese,
supra, note 9; C.-Y. Lai, '"he Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association in Victoria: Its
Origins and Functions" (1972) 15 BC Stud. 53; J. Tan, "Chinese Labour and the Reconstituted
Social Order of British Columbia" (1987) 19:3 Can. Ethnic Stud. 68 and M. Yu, "Human
Rights, Discrimination, and Coping Behaviour of the Chinese in Canada" (1987) 19:3 Can.
Ethnic Stud. 114.
11 T. Adilman, "A Preliminary Sketch of Chinese Women and Work in British Columbia
1858-1950," in B.K. Latham & R.J. Pazdro, eds, Not Just Pin Money: Selected Essays on the
History of Women's Work in British Columbia (Victoria: Camosun College, 1984).
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This study seeks to build on the above analyses by
demonstrating how the legal structure of Canadian federalism played
a significant role in creating and consolidating a racial hierarchy
within the province. A close examination of conventional legal
sources12 reveals that judicial and federal cabinet interpretations of
the Constitution tended to permit uses of state power that
contributed to the formation of a class structure embedded in and
intertwined with relations of racial inequality and to prohibit those
that did not.
The study is limited to BC legislation because it was in BC
that the vast majority of the Canadian Chinese and Japanese
population resided during the period of constitutional conflict under
study.13 Because BC was the Dominion's sole province on the
Pacific coast, it provided the port of entry for almost all Asian
immigrants in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. For
these reasons, federal-provincial conflict over Asian immigration and
employment occurred almost exclusively in BC. The specific focus of
this paper should not obscure the fact that Japanese and Chinese
persons settling east of BC were
also subject to discrimination in
4
provincial and municipal laws!
I begin in Part II with a description of the nature and source
of the Dominion powers of reservation and disallowance of
provincial laws, and I offer general explanations for the manner in
which these powers were exercised with regard to BC anti-Asian
legislation. In Part I, I will explore the constitutional fate of the
nine anti-Asian immigration Acts passed between 1884 and 1908. In
the second part of this study, the analysis will proceed with a
12 In tracing the legal-constitutional history of BC anti-Asian legislation, I have relied
primarily on the BC Legislative journal and sessional papers, the statutes of British Columbia,
reported judicial decisions, and two valuable volumes compiling correspondence and reports
relating to the use of the federal disallowance power. W.E. Hodgins, Dominion and Provincial
Legislation (1867-1895) (Ottawa: Government Printing Bureau, 1896) and F.H. Gisborne &
A.A. Fraser, Correspondence,Reports of the Minister of Justice and Orders in Council Upon
the Subject of ProvincialLegislation, 1896-1920, vol. 2 (Ottawa: F.A. Acland, 1922).

13 For example, in 1911, of all Chinese and Japanese residents of Canada, 95% of the
Japanese population and 70% of the Chinese population resided in BC. See Roy, supra, note
9 at 269; see also Li, supra, note 9 at 51.
14 See H.D. Palmer, "Anti-Oriental Sentiment in Alberta 1880-1920" (1970) 2:2 Can.
Ethnic Stud. 31; Lai, supra, note 9; Adachi, supra, note 9 and Chan, supra, note 9.
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consideration of each of the other types of BC anti-Asian legislation
enacted from 1872 to 1923: legislation restricting the rights of
Asians to be employed in certain industries, private companies'
incorporation legislation with clauses prohibiting the hiring of Asian
labour, legislation excluding Asians from the right to vote and the
right to hold public office, and legislation imposing discriminatory
taxation, licensing or regulatory requirements on Asians. By tracing
the ultimate constitutional fate of each instance of anti-Asian
legislation, a clear pattern of results emerges regarding each type
of legislation. The immigration and labour laws were almost
invariably ruled ultra vires in the courts, reserved by the LieutenantGovernor of BC or disallowed by the federal cabinet; the other
discriminatory laws were rarely reserved or disallowed and, with a
few exceptions, survived constitutional challenges in the courts.
II. THE FEDERAL POWERS OF DISALLOWANCE AND
RESERVATION
A. The Nature of the Powers
The powers of disallowance and reservation function as
executive restraints on the exercise of power by a subordinate
legislature 5 They originated as mechanisms for imperial control of
colonial legislatures. When legislative powers were granted to the
British colonies, the Imperial government retained a veto by way of

15 The fullest account of these powers in the Canadian context is G.V. La Forest,
Disallowanceand Reservation ofProvincialLegislation (Ottawa: Dept. of Justice, 1955). See
also Canada, Department of Justice, Memorandum on Dominion Power of Disallowance of
ProvincialLegislation (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1937); J.R. Mallory, supra, note 3; J.R. Mallory,
'The Lieutenant-Governor as a Dominion Officer:. The Reservation of the Three Alberta Bills
in 1937" (1948) 14 Can. J. Econ. & Pol. Sci. 502; J.R. Mallory, 'The Lieutenant-Governor's
Discretionary Powers: The Reservation of Bill 56" (1961) 27 Can. J. Econ. & Pol. Sci. 518;
E. Forsey, "Disallowance of Provincial Acts, Reservation of Provincial Bills, and Refusal of

Assent by Lieutenant-Governors Since 1867" (1938) 4 Can. J. Econ. & Pol. Sci. 47; E. Forsey,
'Disallowance of Provincial Acts, Reservation of Provincial Bills, and Refusal of Assent by
Lieutenant-Governors, 1937-1947" (1948) 14 Can. J. Econ. & Pol. Sci. 94; R. Chaput, "Le
ddsaveu ou 'annulation des lois provinciales par le gouvernement fdd~ral" (1975) 6 R.G.D.

305 and L. Wilson, "Disallowance: The Threat to Western Canada" (1974-75) 39 Sask. L.
Rev. 156.
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disallowance over legislation passed by a colonial legislature. In
addition, the Imperial government had the power to intervene prior
to the coming into force of a colonial bill by instructing the
appointed colonial Governor to withhold royal assent, and thereby
prevent the bill from coming into force. Or, if the Governor was
uncertain about whether a colonial bill was consistent with Imperial
policies, he could choose to reserve assent for the opinion of the
Imperial government.
The Constitution Act, 186716 did not purport to end the
hierarchical political relationship between Britain and its North
American colonies. Instead, sections 55 to 57 of the Act expressly
preserved British authority to invalidate any Canadian statute by the
exercise of the powers of disallowance and reservation. Section 55
empowered the Governor-General to withhold or reserve royal
assent, the necessary, final step to a bill becoming an act of
Parliament. Section 56 provided that any Dominion legislation could
be disallowed by Imperial order in council issued within two years of
the legislation's enactment by royal assent.
Moreover, section 90 of the Act replicated the imperial
model in relations between the Dominion government and the
provinces. The Governor-General was given the power to disallow
any provincial legislation within a year of the receipt of an authentic
copy of the legislation by the Secretary of State. In practice, this
power has always been exercised on ministerial advice and has taken
the form of an order in council recommended by the Minister of
Justice.
The provincial Lieutenant-Governors were also given the
powers of reserving and withholding assent to any provincial bill.
The Lieutenant-Governor of a province is appointed by the federal
government (section 58), and can be instructed to withhold royal
assent to provincial bills or to reserve them for the consideration of
the Governor-General (sections 55 and 90), who will act on the
advice of the federal Cabinet. The bill will remain inoperative
unless the Governor-General gives his or her assent within one year
of the date of reservation (sections 57 and 90). The powers of
disallowance or reservation may be exercised whether or not the
16 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (formerly British North America Act, 1867).
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legislation or bill falls within the legislative competence of the
province.
Although the powers of disallowance and reservation are not
constrained by any substantive legal limitations, 17 the formal
limitations are significant. First, the powers relate only to legislative
enactments, and not to other forms of delegated decision-making by
executive or administrative bodies.
Secondly, the powers of
disallowance and reservation cannot be used to excise only the
offending portions of a statute, leaving the balance intact. It is an
all or nothing choice: the federal authorities must choose between
allowing the entire Act to stand, or having it fall in its entirety.
From the Dominion's point of view, this is an inconvenient
limitation, for disallowance will disrupt expectations built on
legislation that has already gone into force and that may be
unobjectionable apart from one clause.
Thirdly, and most
significantly, the disallowance power must be exercised within one
year of the receipt of the legislation in Ottawa. Beyond this one
year period where the threat of disallowance hangs over provincial
legislation, Ottawa loses its ability to unilaterally nullify provincial
laws. As we shall see, all of these formal features of disallowance
influenced Dominion Cabinet decisions regarding the use of the
power against Bc anti-Asian legislation.
The executive powers of disallowance and reservation
conferred on the Dominion with respect to provincial legislation
long outlived the legitimacy and use of the Imperial powers.1 8

17 Duff CJ.C. affirmed that "[i]t is indisputable in point of law [that] the authority is
unrestricted.": Reference Re the Powers of Disallowance and Reservation, [1938] S.C.R. 71 at
78 [hereinafter Re Powers]. This was true prior to 1982, but it may be that any future use
of the powers will be open to challenge on the grounds that they must be exercised in a
manner consistent with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. See Operation Dismantle v. R,
[1985] 1 S.C.R. 441 at 455, where the Supreme Court held that cabinet decisions taken
pursuant to the Royal Prerogative "fall under s. 32(1)(a) of the Charter and are therefore
reviewable in the courts and subject to judicial scrutiny for compatibility with the
Constitution." It is likely that executive decisions to exercise the powers of disallowance and
reservation would similarly be subject to the constraints of the Charter.
18 The Imperial power of reservation was exercised eleven times between 1867 and 1878,
and one Dominion statute was disallowed in 1873. Apart from these early uses, the Imperial
powers were abandoned in practice, and formally disavowed at the 1930 Imperial Conference.
The United Kingdom agreed not to exercise the power of disallowance, nor to instruct the
Governor-General of Canada to reserve assent to Canadian statutes. See P. Hogg,
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Since Confederation, 70 bills have been reserved by Lieutenant
Governors, and 112 provincial statutes have been disallowed by
federal order in council, 19 as the following table illustrates.
Disallowances of Provincial Legislation by Period and ProvinceW
18671881

18811896

18961911

19111924

19241945

1945-

Total

12

8

2121

2

0

0

43

Alberta

-

-

0

1

0

12

Sask.

-

-

3

0

0

0

3

Manitoba

6

3

0

0

0

28

Ontario

5

3

2

0

0

0

10

Quebec

2

3

1

0

0

0

6

BC

1923

1122

ConstitutionalLaw of Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1985) at 202: 'This conference
[1930] and the full acceptance of responsible government have established a convention that
the Governor General must always give royal assent to a bill which has passed both Houses
of Parliament. There is no circumstance which would justify a refusal of assent, or a
reservation, or a British disallowance."
19 These figures are drawn from the tables set out in La Forest, supra, note 15 at 83115. These tables conveniently summarize every act and bill that was disallowed or reserved
respectively. I know of only one instance in which these powers were exercised after La
Forest's study was published in 1955, namely, the reservation of Saskatchewan's Bill 56 in 1961
described in Mallory, "The Lieutenant-Governor's Discretionary Powers: The Reservation of
Bill 56," supra, note 15.
20 Compiled from the data in La Forest, supra, note 15.
21 Of the twenty-two disallowances of BC anti-Asian statutes between 1878 and 1921,
eighteen occurred between 1898 and 1908.
22 These eleven disallowances related to the Alberta government's attempts to establish
a system of Social Credit, that included, inter alia, a general clearance of mortgage debts in
the province. See, generally, Mallory, supra, note 3; C.B. Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta:
Social Credit & The Party System (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968).
23 Twelve of the Manitoba statutes disallowed in this period authorized the construction
of railways in the province, at odds with the Dominion policy of granting a monopoly to the
CPR. See J.A. Jackson, The Disallowance of Manitoba Railway Legislation in the 1880's:
Railway Policy as a Factor in the Relations of Manitoba with the Dominion, 1878-1888 (M.A.
Thesis, University of Manitoba, 1945) [unpublished].
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18671881

18811896

18961911

19111924

19241945

1945-

NB

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

NS

5

1

0

3

0

0

9

PEI

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

-

0

0

11

0

112

Nfld

TOTAL

30

35

30

6

Total

From the vantage point of the contemporary operation of
Canadian federalism, it is difficult to imagine that, from
Confederation to the First World War, the powers of reservation
and disallowance were used as a significant Dominion means of
policing the legislative policies of the provinces. Between 1867 and
1920, 66 bills were reserved, and 96 statutes were disallowed. 2 4
Each year up until the early 1920s, the Ministers of Justice
scrupulously reviewed provincial legislation to determine what laws
ought to be disallowed and prepared lengthy reports on the
25
legislation they found objectionable.
Given the pervasive nature of Dominion supervision of
provincial legislation, federal control could be exerted without having
to resort to reservation or disallowance: many potential legislative
initiatives were thwarted or amended in the face of the threat or
fear of Dominion disallowance. The provinces had to alter the form
in which they pursued their policies to evade the limitations imposed
by the Dominion government's exercise of the disallowance power
(and, of course, to evade limitations imposed by the judicial
interpretation of the division of powers). The history of BC anti-

24 Of the occasions where reservation of a provincial bill has occurred since
Confederation, 94% occurred prior to 1920; a similarly high percentage of all disallowances
occurred prior to 1920 (86%). These numbers are based on the information in La Forest,
supra, note 15.
25 La Forest, supra, note 15 at 26. The deliberations and reasoning behind the Ministers'
decisions, including the texts of correspondence and official reports, are fully documented in
two volumes: Hodgins, supra, note 12, and Gisborne & Fraser, supra, note 12.
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Asian legislation is a long, constitutional "tango" between Victoria
and Ottawa, each move precipitating a counter-move by the other
level of government. BC legislators demonstrated an extraordinary
(although largely unsuccessful) capacity for constitutional adaptation,
creativity and perseverance in pursuing an Asian exclusion policy in
the face of Ottawa's opposition.
In the early years after Confederation, the federal
government developed principles to constrain and justify the use of
the disallowance power.26 The fragile legitimacy of a Dominion veto
over any provincial legislation would have been threatened if its use
had appeared randomly despotic. As Vipond has demonstrated,
through the 1870s disallowance was justified primarily as a
jurisdictional veto.27 The federal cabinet exercised the role later
played exclusively by the courts.
The Dominion government risked a provincial rights backlash
that a disallowed statute dealt with a subject matter
it
admitted
if
validly within provincial jurisdiction. Disallowance had greater
legitimacy if it was premised on the supremacy of the Constitution
rather than the supremacy of Dominion policy in provincial areas of
For this reason, the argument that the federal
jurisdiction.
government was simply policing the boundaries of provincial
jurisdiction remained the most common justification offered for the
use of disallowance throughout its history. This led to the
development of a self-serving jurisprudence of the division of powers
fashioned in official reports prepared by Ministers of Justice. These
reports lacked the status of legal precedents, but nevertheless played
an important role in the shaping of early constitutional doctrine at
a time when court decisions had provided only the barest sketch of
the division of powers. Indeed, in some areas, such as provincial
jurisdiction over immigration, the repeated use of disallowance

26 For example, in 1869, MacDonald laid down four grounds on which provincial

legislation ought to be disallowed: 1) where the legislation was wholly illegal or
unconstitutional; 2) where it was illegal or unconstitutional in part; 3) where it clashed with
federal legislation in fields of concurrent jurisdiction; and, 4) where it affected interests of the

Dominion as a whole. Canada, H.C., "Disallowance" by Sir John MacDonald (Minister of
Justice) in Sessional Papers, No. 18 (1869) (vol. 5 at 1 of the paper).

27 See R.C. Vipond, "Constitutional Politics and the Legacy of the Provincial Rights
Movement in Canada" (1985) 18 Can. J. Pol. Sci. 267.
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meant that jurisprudence developed by federal Ministers of Justice
had the effect of pre-empting judicial interpretation of the
constitutional division of powers.
Disallowance was not always justified as a jurisdictional veto.
According to Vipond, beginning in the 1880s, "As the nationbuilding pretensions of the MacDonald government began to grow,
so did its use of disallowance."28 The federal government was
devoted to the National Policy, building the railway, and maintaining
conditions favourable to capital investment. These goals were
interpreted as requiring the disallowance of statutes interfering with
vested property and contract rights.9 Between 1881 and 1887, the
federal government disallowed fourteen Manitoba railroad charters
on the grounds that they interfered with the monopoly of the CPR
and would have diverted trade to the United States away from the
fledgling Canadian system of railways 3 0 Over the years, the western
provinces were especially vulnerable to disallowance: of the 112
instances in which the power was exercised, legislation from the
western provinces fell victim on eighty-six occasions3 l
The legitimacy of the powers of disallowance and reservation
became increasingly fragile over time as a hierarchical conception of
the Canadian federation was gradually contested and replaced by the
view that the provinces and the federal government are equally
autonomous bodies when acting within their respective spheres of
jurisdiction s2 In addition, the growing acceptance of the principles
of liberal democracy undermined the legitimacy of the powers of
disallowance and reservation. These powers were an all too visible
and partisan interference with the provincial legislative process. An
increased reliance on the courts replaced the blatantly antidemocratic nature of the disallowance power. In addition, the
28

bid.

29bi. The most well-known example being the repeated disallowance of the Ontario
River and Streams Act beginning in 1881.

30 Jackson, supra, note 23.
31 1bid and Wilson, supra, note 15.
32 See Vipond, supra, note 27; J. Smith, 'The Origins of Judicial Review in Canada"
(1983) 16 Can. J. Pol. Sci. 115 and P. Macklem, "Constitutional Ideologies" (1988) 20 Ottawa

L Rev. 117.
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parameters of provincial jurisdiction became more clearly defined
over time by judicial decisions and by the use of federal
disallowance. As a result, the disciplinary, policing function of
In modem Canadian
disallowance became less important.
federalism, federal control of provincial policies is less necessary
than it was in the first half century following Confederation, and is
now exercised by more subtle fiscal and regulatory powers. For all
of these reasons, resort to the powers of reservation and
disallowance has fallen off dramatically since 1920.
In 1938, the Supreme Court held that the powers continue
to exist in law, unaffected by their abandonment in practice. 33 The
disallowance power has not been invoked since 1942, and no bills
have been reserved since 1961. Although one occasionally hears
calls for the resuscitation of the disallowance power, typically to
34
prevent the provinces from overriding Charterrights and freedoms,
any federal government would pay a high political price for such an
invasion of provincial autonomy. Disputes relating to the federal
division of power are now resolved through processes of
intergovernmental negotiation or by resort to the courts. Thus, in
the future, disallowance will likely be used sparingly, if at all, to veto
provincial policies that run seriously afoul of central Canadian
economic interests, as, for example, Alberta Social Credit legislation
did in the late 1930s and early 1940s. The federal government can
no longer routinely police the boundaries of provincial jurisdiction
by resort to unilateral, executive fiat. At the moment, the continued
legal existence of the powers is an anomalous legacy of the quasicolonial relationship of the provinces to the federal government
embodied in the ConstitutionAct, 1867.
Mallory has described the disallowance power as "an imperial
device for holding other provinces under the sway of the
predominant economic interest of the central provinces." 35 Forsey's
evaluation of the role of the disallowance power is similar:
33

Re Powers, supra, note 17.

34 See, for example, N. Finkelstein, "Quebec Language Dispute: 'Ottawa Must Take
Action'" The Globe and Mail (17 January 1989) A7 and P. Weiler, "Rights and Judges in a
Democracy: A New Canadian Version" (1984) 18 Mich. J.L. Reform 51 n. 107.
35 Mallory, supra, note 3 at 176-77.
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[Hie would be rash indeed who would now venture to suggest that the power of

disallowance is any safeguard except for the liberties of those who are as a rule well
able to look after themselves. The Dominion Government will be on the side of

the big battalions. The revival of Dominion control over the provinces is really the
revival of Dominion control over such provinces as try to do things which the
dominant economic interests of Canada dislike.3 6

While Mallory and Forsey were not directing their analyses of the
disallowance power to its use against BC anti-Asian statutes, its use
in this context is consistent with their assessments. Although
Ministers of Justice frequently recommended disallowance on the
grounds that Bc anti-Asian legislation was ultra vires or inconsistent
with Imperial treaty obligations, the pattern of disallowances of antiAsian legislation as a whole can be explained only by reference to
Dominion or Imperial economic interests. Before embarking on a
detailed analysis of the constitutional fate of each instance of BC
anti-Asian legislation to demonstrate this thesis, it is necessary to
provide some background on Imperial treaties with China and Japan,
and on the intersection of social hierarchies based on race and class
in early British Columbia.
B. British Treaties with China and Japan
A series of unequal treaties were imposed upon China by the
European imperialist powers in the nineteenth century. The main
purposes of these treaties were to transfer control of territory to the
European states and to open up specified Chinese ports to
European trade. At the end of the Opium War (1839-42), China
and Britain entered the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Commerce
signed at Nanking on 29 August 1842.s 7 Article 1 of the Treaty of
Nanking provided that the subjects of China and Great Britain "shall
enjoy full security and protection for their persons and property
within the Dominions of the other."38 Britain's victory in the Opium
36 E. Forsey, "Canada and Alberta:

The Revival of Dominion Control over the

Provinces" (1939) 4:16 Politiea 95 at 123.
37 C. Parry, ed., The Consolidated Treaty Series, vol. 93 (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana
Publications, 1919) (1842) at 465 [hereinafter Treaty of Nanking].
38

bid at 466.
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War was followed by many other foreign invasions of China,
resulting each time in an unequal treaty that interfered with the
territorial and economic integrity of China. A second Treaty of
Peace, Friendship and Commerce,39 signed at Tientsin on 26 June
1858, renewed and confirmed the provisions of the 1842 Treaty of
Nanking. Other international agreements involving China in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth century simply enlarged the
40
trading rights of Britain and other foreign powers in China.
Britain was also interested in securing the right to import Chinese
labour. By Article 5 of the Peking Convention of 1860, the Chinese
Emperor undertook to decree that Chinese subjects are "at perfect
liberty ...
to take service in British Colonies ...
and to enter into

engagements with British subjects for that purpose."41 The treaty
rights of Chinese subjects to "enjoy full security and protection for
their persons and property" while in British Dominions such as
Canada remained unaltered by any subsequent treaty into the
twentieth century. While the Chinese treaty rights existed on paper,
in practice their existence was rarely acknowledged by legal decisionmakers in Canada.
Whereas the treaties with China originated in the European
powers' desire for commercial exploitation, Britain's treaties with
Japan were motivated by a strategic desire for a military and
commercial alliance to better secure its interests in east Asia.
Britain and Japan had a common fear of Russian expansion in China
and Korea. Their concern to check Russian military and naval
power in east Asia led to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which lasted
formally from 1902 until 1923.42 The Treaty of Commerce and
Navigation between Great Britain and Japan, signed on 16 July

39 Ibid, vol. 119 (1859) at 163 (Article 1).
40 See J.B. Eames, 7he English in China (London:

Curzon Press, 1974) at 541-43.

41 ConsolidatedTreaty Series, vol. 123 (1860-61) at 71. See also the London Convention

of May 13, 1904, ibid, vol. 195 (1904) at 257.
42

I.H. Nish, The Anglo-JapaneseAlliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires 1894-

1907, 2d ed. (Dover, N.H.: Athlone Press, 1985); LH.Nish, Alliance in Decline: A Study in
Anglo-JapaneseRelations1908-23 (London: Athlone Press, 1972); A.R.M. Lower, Canadaand
the FarEast - 1940 (New York. Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940) and C.I. Woodsworth,
Canada and the Orient" A Study in InternationalRelations (Toronto: MacMillan, 1941).
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1894, and renewed in 1905 and 1911, provided in Article 1 that
"[t]he subjects of each of the two High Contracting Parties shall
have full liberty to enter, travel, or reside in any part of the
dominions and possessions of the other Contracting Party, and shall
43
enjoy full and perfect protection for their persons and property."
By the Japanese Treaty Acts of 1907 and 1913, the Canadian
government declared that this treaty would have the force of law in
Canada. 44 Prior to 1907, neither the Chinese nor Japanese treaties
had been incorporated in Canadian domestic law.
Throughout the period under study, Chinese and Japanese
subjects residing in BC had similar treaty rights to enjoy the
protection of their persons and property arising from the 1842
Treaty of Nanking and the 1894 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation
respectively. However, no matter how similar Chinese and Japanese
nationals in Canada were in terms of the treaty rights that could be
asserted on their behalf by their respective governments,
diplomatically their situations were worlds apart. Japan was a rising
international power; China a subjugated state. As a result, Canadian
authorities paid little heed to the Chinese treaties, while they
treated Japanese treaty rights very seriously, even before they were
enacted into domestic law in 1907.
As we shall see, while disallowance was exercised repeatedly
on the grounds that it was necessary to safeguard treaty rights, this
was true only of the Japanese treaties. The western powers viewed
the Chinese treaties in a manner consistent with their origins: they
were unilateral treaties operating to their benefit in China. The
clear terms of the Chinese treaties were ignored when it came to
protecting the rights of Chinese nationals in Canada. For China,
naturally, the treaties meant what they said: they granted reciprocal
rights to Chinese and foreign citizens to the protection of their
45
persons and property in the dominions of the other.
The conclusion is inescapable that the principle of protecting
treaty rights did not in itself determine the use of federal
disallowance against BC anti-Asian legislation. The exercise of
43 ConsolidatedTreaty Series, vol.180 (1894) at 257.
44 S.C. 1907, c. 50; S.C. 1913, c. 27.
45 Andracki, supra, note 9 at 17-19.
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disallowance, however, was strongly informed by the need to
preserve Imperial economic and diplomatic interests. Securing
Imperial interests in China and elsewhere in Asia was dependent on
the maintenance of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance; China, rendered a
helpless power, could safely be ignored.
C. Race and Class in BC
In addition to Imperial interests in Asia, the exercise of
disallowance cannot be explained without an understanding of the
dynamics of race and class in early British Columbia and, in
particular, of the phenomenon of a racially fragmented labour
market. 46 In such a labour market, wage differentials exist between
racial groups performing similar tasks. In addition, segmentation
occurs by job function, with the dominant racial group monopolizing
higher paid positions and the lower groups restricted to marginal
participation, performing the most menial unskilled labour. Both of
these phenomena occurred in BC. For example, Chinese and
Japanese workers were paid anywhere from one quarter to two
thirds less than what unskilled white men were paid for performing
the same tasks.4 7 And Chinese and Japanese workers in the mines
were frequently employed as white miners' helpers and Chinese

46 On "split labour market theory," see G.S. Basran, "Canadian Immigration Policy and
Theories of Racism" in B.S. Bolaria & P.S. Li, eds, RacialMinorities in Multicultural Canada

(Toronto: Garamond Press, 1983) 3-14; B.S. Bolaria & P.S. Li, Racial Oppression in Canada
(Toronto: Garamond Press, 1988) at 27-40; P.S. Li, Ethnic Inequality in a Class Society
(Toronto: Wall and Thompson, 1988) at 39-53; A. Szymanski, "Racism and Sexism as
Functional Substitutes in the Labour Market" (1976) 17 Soc. Q. 65; Li, supra, note 9 at 46;
M. Reich, "The Economics of Racism" in D.M. Gordon, ed., Problems in PoliticalEconomy:
An Urban Perspective (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1971) 107; E.Bonacich, "A Theory of
Ethnic Antagonism: The Split Labor Market" (1972) 37 Am. Soc. Rev. 547 and E. Bonacich,
"'The Past, Present and Future of Split Labor Market Theory" in C.B. Marrett & C. Leggon,
eds, Research in Race and Ethnic Relations: A ResearchAnnual, vol. 1 (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI
Press, 1979) 17.
47

Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Chinese andJapaneseImmigration (Ottawa:
Printed by S.E. Dawson, 1902) (Chair R.C. Clute) at 64-211; Li, supra, note 9 at 44 and
Creese, supra, note 9.
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48
miners were legislatively excluded from positions of responsibility.
Racism affected

[tlhe allocation of persons to different positions in the production process and the
allocation of material and other rewards and disadvantages to groups so categorised
49
within the class boundaries established by the dominant modes of production.

A complex and disparate array of factors contributed to the
development of a racially stratified labour market in British
Columbia. First, many Chinese, Japanese and European workers
came to Canada as contract labourers, recruited by labour agencies.
These workers were obligated to pay back the agencies the costs of
travel and any other advances through deductions from their wages.
After disembarking from ships, many immigrant workers went
directly to boarding houses where labour contractors would come for
men.
The contract labour method of recruitment promoted both
racial isolation and intra-group solidarity.
Secondly, employers promoted and exploited racial divisions
to their advantage.
Employment practices contributed to the
creation of an economic hierarchy with British workers at the top,
followed by other Europeans, with Asians and First Nations' workers
at the bottom. Employers successfully used sub-groups of this
racially stratified labour force as strike breakers, to cut wages or
otherwise to divide the interests of the working class and prevent
the development of class solidarity.
Thirdly, state policies contributed to a racially stratified
labour market by denying legal, political and civil rights to nonEuropean racial groups. These policies restricted the political
influence of and options open to members of non-European racial
groups. As a result, the bargaining power of Asian and First
Nations' workers with employers and other workers was reduced;
this in turn made it possible to justify racial wage differences.
According to Bonacich,

48 Roy, supra, note 9 and Ryder, supra, note 5, c. 1, "Labour Legislation".
49 R. Miles, Racism and MigrantLabour (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982) at
159.
50 Adachi, supra, note 9 at 31.
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[Tihe prejudices of business do not determine the price of labor, darker skinned or
culturally different persons being paid less because of them. Rather, business tries
to pay as little as possible for labor, regardless of ethnicity, and is held in check by
the resources and motives of labor groups. Since
5 1 these often vary by ethnicity, it
is common to find ethnically split labor markets.

Thus, as Creese argues, a racially stratified labour market results
from the "unequal economic, political, and cultural resources
available to engage in the struggle for better pay and working
conditions.'5 2 Over time the low economic status of racial groups
who perform menial labour further reinforces their social
marginality. 53
The bargaining power of immigrant workers, for example, is
affected by the legal rights accorded them by the state, which in
turn will be affected by the degree of diplomatic influence that can
be exerted by the worker's home state to advance legal protection
abroad. As we shall see, Japan's rise as an international power, and
China's subjugation by imperial states, had some influence in
producing differing legal treatment of Chinese and Japanese
residents of BC In protesting anti-Japanese laws, Japanese diplomats
insisted that their people be distinguished from the Chinese, whom
they viewed as an inferior race. For military and commercial
reasons, the Dominion and Imperial governments urged BC to
Japan's greater
exempt Japanese from its anti-Asian laws.
diplomatic clout would have resulted in a greater disparity in the
legal treatment of Japanese and Chinese if BC legislative provisions
had treated Chinese and Japanese persons separately. But BC voters
and politicians insisted on passing provisions excluding Chinese and
Japanese alike; if anything, the growing strength of the Japanese
Empire led them to harbour a greater fear of Japanese labour
competition 5 4 As a result, appeals by the Japanese for federal
disallowance, where they were successful, ironically worked to
remove legal discrimination against the Chinese as well.

Bonacich, "A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism," supra, note 46 at 553.
52 Creese, supra, note 9 at 59.
53 Li, supra, note 9 at 34.

54 Adachi, supra, note 9 at 46-47.
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A racially-structured labour force heightened racial awareness
and racial tension. For example, the mainstream, Euro-Canadian
labour movement, represented by the Trades and Labour Congress
of Canada, opposed Asian immigration and sought to restrict Asian
employment. 5 Wages, working conditions and job security were
poor and further threatened, in the eyes of most white workers, by
Asian and other "undesirable" workers. Asian workers and socialist
trade unions made attempts to organize workers of all races, but
generally, in late nineteenth and early twentieth century British
Columbia, the development of class solidarity was hindered by racial
divisions. 56 Unions were seeking legal recognition, better wages and
better working conditions. BC politicians were slow to respond to
these demands to empower working people as a whole. However,
they were willing to negotiate the Asian immigration issue, and
manipulated it to give the appearance that they were doing
something for the white working man. In fact, until the turn of the
century, the only significant legislative initiatives channelled labour
issues - resulting from the use of strike breakers, low wages and
poor working conditions - into immigration and racial issues. In this
way difficulties caused by underlying industrial conflict were
consistently reconstructed as racial problems.
Viewed in light of the social context of a racially fragmented
labour market, federal disallowance followed a pattern that favoured
the interests of the European capitalist class in British Columbia.
Laws that interfered with the ability of employers to take advantage
of a segregated and marginal Asian labour force, such as
prohibitions on Asian immigration and employment, were
consistently disallowed.
Laws that rendered Asian workers a

55 R.R. Ireland, "Some Effects of Oriental Immigration on Canadian Trade Union
Ideology' (1960) 19 Am. J. Econ. & Soc. 217; PA Phillips, No Power Greater: A Century of

Labour in British Colunbia (Vancouver:. B.C. Federation of Labour, 1967) and J.T. Saywell,
'abour and Socialism in British Columbia: A Survey of Historical Development Before 1903"
[1951] B.C. Hist. Q. 129.
56 See E. Comack, "'We will get some good out of this riot yet': The Canadian State,
Drug Legislation and Class Conflict" in S. Brickey & E. Comack, eds, The Social Basis of
Law: Critical Readings in the Sociolog of Law (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1986) 67 and
Phillips, supra, note 55 at 78, notes that it was not until a 1919 conference of the BC
Federation of Labour that "[t]he triumph of the socialists was evident in the abandonment of
anti-orientalism and the resolution that 'this body recognizes no alien but the capitalist'."

1991]

Racism and the Constitution

relatively powerless sector of the labour force, by depriving them of
rights and opportunities in the province other than the right to take
up wage employment, were generally allowed to remain in place.
III. THE DISALLOWANCE OF BC ANTI-ASIAN
IMMIGRATION ACTS
A. Section 95 of the British North America Act
Between 1884 and 1908, the British Columbia legislature
passed nine immigration acts prohibiting Asian immigration into the
province. The first two acts, passed in 1884 and 1885, prohibited
Chinese immigration. The last seven acts, passed annually from
1900 to 1908, empowered officials to require prospective immigrants
to pass a test in any language of Europe prior to admission. These
latter acts were aimed at excluding Japanese and other Asian
immigrants. None of these acts was in force for long. Of the nine
immigration acts, eight were disallowed by the federal Cabinet within
a year of their coming into force, and one was reserved by
Lieutenant-Governor Dunsmuir in 1907.
Neither treaty rights nor the constitutional distribution of
powers provides a full explanation for the pattern of federal
disallowance of BC anti-Asian immigration laws. BC'S Chinese
immigration acts were disallowed in 1884 and 1885 notwithstanding
direction from the Imperial authorities that Chinese treaties need
not be considered. As for provincial jurisdiction to legislate
regarding immigration, section 95 of the Constitution Act, 1867
granted the provinces and the federal government concurrent
jurisdiction over the regulation of immigration and agriculture:
In each Province the Legislature may make Laws in relation to Agriculture in the
Province, and to Immigration into the Province; and it is hereby declared that the
Parliament of Canada may from Time to Time make laws in relation to Agriculture
in all or any of the Provinces, and to Immigration into all or any of the Provinces;
and any Law of the Legislature of a Province relative to Agriculture or to
Immigration shall have effect in and for the Province as long and as far only as it

is not repugnant to any Act of the Parliament of Canada.

The text of section 95 appears to give the provincial and federal
governments equal powers to pass laws regarding immigration within
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their respective territorial boundaries. 57 Provincial immigration laws
are valid and will operate subject to federal paramountcy if they are
repugnant to (inconsistent with) any federal law.
In practice, the federal government has exercised exclusive
control over the definition of admissible categories of immigrants
since Confederation. BC anti-Asian legislation represents the only
provincial attempt to exert significant legislative control over
immigration in Canadian history.58 Conflict between Ottawa and
Victoria over Asian immigration provided the context in which a
strategy of exclusive Dominion legislative control over immigration
was forged. Until 1906, Dominion control was exercised by means
of the disallowance power; thereafter, with the passage of the first
comprehensive federal immigration legislation in 1906, federal
dominance of immigration policy has been ensured by the rule of
federal paramountcy set out in section 95.
As we shall see, BC immigration laws were disallowed in 1884
and 1885 to ensure a supply of Chinese labour for railway
construction. From 1900 to 1908, disallowance was motivated by a
desire to preserve the Anglo-Japanese alliance by which Imperial
commercial and military interests in east Asia were secured.
However, federal Ministers of Justice preferred to explain
disallowance on legal, jurisdictional grounds rather than asserting
the primacy of Dominion policies in an area of shared jurisdiction
with the provinces. This led to the articulation of significant
limitations on provincial powers over immigration to justify the use
of federal disallowance. According to federal cabinet interpretations
of section 95, the provincial power to "make laws in relation to
On the scope of provincial powers under section 95, see M. Lemieu, "Immigration:
A Provincial Concern" (1983) 13 Man. L.J. 111; J.H. Grey, Inmigration Law in Canada

(Toronto: Butterworths, 1984) at 5-7; J. Mercier, "Immigration et Droits des Provinces"
(1944) 4 R. du B. 149 and J. Brossard, L'Imnigration: Les Droits et Pouvoirs du Canada et
du Qutbec (Montrdal: Les Presses de l'Universit6 de Montreal, 1967).
58 Brossard, ibid at 104-13, describes provincial immigration initiatives since
Confederation. The provinces were involved in promotional policies in the United States and
Europe similar to those conducted by the federal government: N. MacDonald, Canada:
Immigration and Colonization 1841-1903 (Toronto: MacMillan, 1966) at 90; J.D. Cameron,
The Development of Legislation Relating to Emigration to Canada (Ph.D. Thesis, University
of Toronto, 1943) [unpublished] and H.M. Troper, On* Farmers Need Apply: Official
Canadian Government Encouragement of Immigration from the United States, 1896-1911
(Toronto: Griffin House, 1972).
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immigration into the province" meant that the provinces had the
authority to promote immigration into the province, but lacked the
power to prohibit immigration. The courts had little opportunity to
consider this interpretation of section 95. In all but one instance,
Bc immigration acts were disallowed before any court challenge was
brought. When the constitutional validity of a Bc anti-Asian
immigration act was finally considered in court in 1908, it was ruled
inoperative on the grounds that it conflicted with two paramount
federal statutes, the 1906 Dominion Immigration Act and the 1907
Japanese Treaty Act.59
It might be argued that the focus placed here on Dominion
economic interests ignores a simpler explanation for the disallowance
of BC immigration laws based in the reality of Canadian geography.
In matters of immigration policy prior to the era of air travel,
Ontario and the prairie provinces were largely at the mercy of the
provinces with active ocean ports. As BC is Canada's only Pacific
province, its assertion of jurisdiction over Asian immigration under
section 95 could have effectively established a policy of Asian
Disallowance could be
exclusion for the entire Dominion.
understood as an indication of the Dominion government's insistence
that it alone should be entitled to establish policies that will have an
impact on the Dominion as a whole.
However, federal politicians did not object to BC'S
immigration policy on the grounds that it blocked the rest of the
country's access to Asian immigrants. The immigration recruitment
policies of the federal government and the provinces indicated that
they lacked interest in promoting Asian immigration. Moreover,
migration of Asian settlers east of the Rockies was negligible prior
to the turn of the century. ° Central Canadian politicians did
express dismay at the potential damage to trade relations with Japan
that might result from BC's actions. 61 The evidence suggests that
Ottawa insisted on controlling Asian immigration into BC because of
the importance it attached to the maintenance of both an adequate
59
See infra, notes 164-68 and accompanying text.
60 Li, supra, note 9 at 51.
61 See infra, note 133.
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supply of cheap labour in BC and of Imperial relations with Japan.
So long as these two concerns were satisfied, the Dominion
government was as willing as the BC government to pursue a "white
Canada" immigration policy.
B. Disallowance of the 1884-85 BC Chinese Immigration Acts
From Confederation to the First World War, the Dominion
government's main immigration policy goal was to attract European
agriculturalists with capital. 62 It pursued advertising campaigns in
Europe and the United States, warning the physically "unfit" and the
indigent that they were not welcome, and promising capitalists a
good return on investment. 63 It paid bonuses to steamship lines for
each European immigrant brought to Canadian shores.
The
government offered free land to farmers and gave railway companies
huge grants of land for resale to immigrants. No agents were
commissioned, no promotional literature was distributed and no
plans were made for the agricultural settlement of Asians.
In five Dominion-provincial conferences held between 1868
and 1874, the Dominion and provincial governments agreed to
cooperate in seeking to attract European settlers and in facilitating
the settlement of uncultivated lands.64 These conferences were
aimed at developing a cooperative approach to the exercise of
concurrent jurisdiction under section 95. The provinces agreed that
control of immigration should be exercised exclusively by the

62 The Dominion policy was a continuation of colonial and Imperial policies prior to
Confederation. Useful sources on nineteenth century and early twentieth century immigration
law and policy are: MacDonald, supra, note 58; S. Imai, Canadian Immigration Law and
Policy: 1867-1935 (LL.M. Thesis, Osgoode Hall Law School, 1983) [unpublished]; M. Timlin,
"Canada's Immigration Policy, 1896-1910" (1960) 26 Can. J.Econ. & Pol. Sci. 517; D.H. Avery
& P. Neary, 'Laurier, Borden and a White British Columbia" (1977) 12 J. Can. Stud. 24;
D.H. Avery, "DangerousForeigners": European Immigrant Workers and Labour Radicalism in

Canada,1896-1932 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1979); H. Palmer, ed., Immigration and
the Rise of Multiculturalism (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1975); Troper, supra, note 58; F. Hawkins,
CriticalYears in Immigration: Canadaand Australia Compared (Montreal: McGill-Queen's

University Press, 1989) at 3-25 and Cameron, supra, note 58.
63 MacDonald, supra, note 58 at 107.
64 Cameron, supra, note 58, Book II at 3-13 and MacDonald, supra, note 58 at 96-97.
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Dominion Minister of Agriculture. Reception and colonization of
immigrants would be a provincial responsibility. The Dominion and
the provinces agreed to promote immigration by all means available.
These policies were expressed in the preamble to the first federal
Immigration Ac4 1869.65
For a variety of reasons, Canada was not successful in
attracting European immigrants in the latter half of the nineteenth
Many European countries had restrictive emigration
century.
policies. The United States was a more attractive destination to
Europeans: the climate was preferable, and the u.s. government had
advanced further than Canada in appropriating native lands through
the treaty process, and in building a continental transportation
As a result, Canada's foreign-born population
infrastructure.
remained relatively steady until the turn of the century. One
consequence of low immigration levels was a shortage of labour,
particularly for large nation-building projects like the construction of

the

CPR.

Chinese workers started arriving in the colony of British
Columbia in the 1850s. 66 Many came as contract labourers who
were obligated to pay back the labour recruitment agencies the costs
of travel and any other advances through deductions from their
Some were independent miners, merchants, domestic
wages.
workers and other service workers employed in various industries.
Almost all were men.
The first Chinese men in Victoria in 1858 were drawn by the
discovery of gold in the Fraser Valley and later in the Caribou
region. By 1860, the Chinese population on Vancouver Island was
1,577, compared to 2,884 Europeans. When the gold rush was
seemingly over in the mid 1860s many Chinese stayed. Through the
1870s and 1880s they worked in gold-mining, the salmon canneries,
the Vancouver Island coal mines and in various service occupations.
Chinese workers generally held low paying jobs with unpleasant
working conditions; the better jobs were reserved for white workers.

65 S.C. 1869, c. 10.
66 For thorough descriptions of the causes and patterns of Chinese immigration, see Tan,
supra, note 10; Li, supra, note 9; Chan, supra, note 6; Chan, supra, note 9 and Wickberg,
supra, note 9.
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Nevertheless, by the mid 1870s, after the right to vote had been
denied by legislation to Chinese and "Indians," concerns about
Chinese labour competition began to be expressed in the legislature.
In 1876, the legislature reported that "it is expedient for the
government to take some steps to prevent this province from being
overrun with a Chinese population to the injury of the settled
population of the country."67 Initially, the legislature adopted
discriminatory taxation statutes as the means to accomplish this
objective; when the Chinese Tax Act, 187868 was subsequently ruled
ultra vires and then disallowed by the federal government, 69 the
legislature appealed to Ottawa for a "solution" over the next few
70
years.
From 1881-85, over 15,000 Chinese workers entered BC to
complete the western section of the CPR.71 At the same time, the
railway brought increased numbers of settlers from Europe, the
United States and eastern Canada. In the eighteen months from
June 1883 to November 1884, over 11,000 European immigrants
arrived in BC;72 this influx was followed by increased conflict
between Asian and European workers. In 1882, the BC legislature
demanded that the federal government impose a requirement that
CPR contractors hire European labour only. The federal government
refused to impose such a requirement or to accede to demands to
place limits on Chinese immigration. 73
As Prime Minister

67 British Columbia, Legislative Journals (1876) at 46.
68 S.B.C. 1878, c. 35.
69 See Ryder, supra, note 5, c. 4, "Anti-Asian Taxation and Licensing Legislation."
70 Ward, supra, note 9 at 35 and Wynne, supra, note 9 at 346 & 353. In 1878, Chinese
immigration was discussed in Parliament for the first time. Prime Minister Mackenzie
ridiculed a suggestion that men wearing their hair longer than 5V2 inches be excluded from
working on the Canadian Pacific Railway. A motion to that effect was defeated on the
grounds that it would interfere with the construction of the railway. Woodsworth, supra, note

42 at 26-27.
71 Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Chinese Immigration (Ottawa:
Commission, 1885) (Commissioners: J.A. Chapleau & J.H. Gray) at v.

The

72 bid. at xlix.
73 Avery & Neary, supra, note 62 at 25; Woodsworth, supra, note 42 at 28-40; Li, supra,
note 9 at 27.
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MacDonald put it to the House of Commons in 1883: "It will be all
very well to exclude Chinese labour, when we can replace it with
white labour, but until that is done, it is better to have Chinese
labour than no labour at all."74
Frustrated by federal inaction, the BC legislature appointed
a Select Committee on Chinese Labour and Immigration in 1883.
The Committee made thirty-one recommendations that led to the
passage in February 1884 of three anti-Chinese acts. One of these,
An Act to Prevent the Immigration of Chinese,75 was the first of nine
legislative attempts made by the BC government to prohibit Asian
immigration. In the preamble to the Act, the legislature relied on
section 95 of the Constitution Act, 1867 as the constitutional basis
for its action, and pointed out that "the provisions hereinafter
contained are not repugnant to any Act of the Parliament of
Canada." Section 2 made it unlawful for any Chinese person to
enter the province, imposed a penalty on those who did and
provided that suspected offenders could be arrested without warrant.
In a report dated 7 April 1884, federal Minister of Justice
Alexander Campbell stated his opinion that section 95 did not grant
the provinces jurisdiction to prohibit immigration:
Having reference to the condition of Canada at the time of union of the provinces,
the undersigned is of the opinion that the authority given by the 95th section of the
British North America Act is an authority to regulate and promote immigration into

the province and not an authority to prohibit immigration.
A law which prevents the people of any country
76 from coming into a Province
cannot be said to be of a local or private nature.

74 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, No. 14 at 905 (30 April 1883).
See also Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, No. 12 at 1477 (12 May 1882):

"At present it is simply a question of alternatives: either you must have this labour or you
cannot have the railway..." See also the protests of an eastern MP on the need to use Chinese

labour in order to complete the railway and open up trade to China: Canada, Parliament,
House of Commons Debates, No. 13 at 326 (29 March 1883).

The debates in these years

made it clear that as long as there was a shortage of European labour throughout Canada,
there was very little support for curtailing Chinese immigration. See Wynne, supra, note 9 at

354-57, which contains some remarkable 1882 correspondence from Andrew Onderdonk, the
Chief Contractor of the CPR, to the Prime Minister.
75 S.B.C. 1884, c. 3.
76 Hodgins, supra, note 12 at 1092.
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The federal Minister's view that a province could promote but not
prohibit immigration was a self-serving exercise in constitutional
interpretation. This view had no support in the text of section 95,
nor in the legislative history of the Constitution Act, 1867.77 The
text simply empowers the provinces to pass laws "in relation to
immigration into the province." As with the other subject matters
of jurisdiction allocated to the provinces by the Constitution Act,
1867, the language "in relation to" suggests that any law that in pith
and substance deals with that subject matter, whether in a
prohibitive or facilitative manner, is intra vires the province. 78 While
it lacked a textual basis, Campbell's theory did fit nicely with the
policies of promoting immigration and facilitating settlement that had
been agreed upon by the Dominion and the provinces in the
conferences held after Confederation.79 His view was reiterated by
subsequent Ministers of Justice in future years to explain the
disallowance of BC anti-Asian immigration laws.80 Due in part to
the repeated disallowance of these laws, the theory of restrictive
77
Mercier, supra, note 57 at 152; Brossard, supra, note 57 at 43-52 & 104-13.
78 For example, provincial jurisdiction in relation to property and civil rights (section
92(13)) allows the provinces to pass legislation both protecting or restricting those rights. See,
for example, Citizens Insurance Co. v. Parsons (1881), 7 App. Cas. 96, 1 Cart. 265 (P.C.).
79 Cameron, supra, note 58.
80 See Canada, House of Commons Debates, vol. 58 at 604-5 (27 March 1903). Minister
of Justice Charles Fitzpatrick, after quoting from Minister of Justice Campbell's 1884 opinion,
stated: 'That principle laid down by Sir Alexander Campbell at that time has been followed
ever since with respect to British Columbia legislation on the subject of Chinese emigration."
See also the reliance of the Secretary of State for the colonies on Campbell's opinion in text
accompanying note 126.
Apart from BC legislation, I know of only one other occasion on which Ottawa
considered disallowing a provincial law affecting immigration. In 1893, Nova Scotia passed
a law imposing a penalty of $200 on any person in charge of a vessel bringing a poor or
indigent person to Halifax. Minister of Justice Thompson commented:
To the extent to which this provision is intended to relate to the subject of
immigration it is, in the opinion of the undersigned, ultra vires. Several statutes
have been passed by parliament in relation to the landing in Canada, and removal
therefrom, of pauper and other immigrants likely, to become a public charge.
The undersigned is of opinion, however, that the provision in question may
properly be left to such operation, as it may have with regard to matters within the
legislative authority of the province, and not within that of parliament.
Hodgins, supra, note 12 at 635. The difference between the Nova Scotia provision and BC's
anti-Asian legislation was that the former was not inconsistent with federal immigration policy.
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provincial powers under section 95 was not (and has not been)
tested in the courts.8 1
The text of section 95 employs the same langauge in granting
the provinces and the federal government alike the power to pass
laws "inrelation to immigration." However, the federal government
did not interpret its own power to pass laws in relation to
immigration as being limited to the promotion of immigration. The
1869 ImmigrationAct contained a provision enabling the government
to prohibit the entry of paupers,8 2 and a provision enabling the
government to require that a bond be posted to prevent ill or
disabled immigrants from becoming public charges.8 3 An 1872
amendment authorized the passage of executive8 4orders excluding
"any criminal, or other vicious class of immigrants," and subsequent
federal immigration laws gave the executive unlimited power to
define excludable groups.s 5 Ultimately, the courts upheld the
federal power to prohibit the immigration of particular races or
classes of persons.8 6
Although the constitutional text itself places no limits (other
than territorial limitations) on provincial legislative jurisdiction over
immigration, the language of section 95 does make clear that any
provincial immigration law will be inoperative to the extent that it
is inconsistent with federal laws. The Minister of Justice could have
justified disallowance on the firmer ground of federal paramountcy
if the 1869 federal ImmigrationAct had contained a policy regarding
Chinese immigration. But federal legislation contained no provisions
relating to the race of prospective immigrants.
The only
81 The 1908 BC Immigration Act was held to be inoperative, rather than ultra vires, as
a result of its inconsistency with paramount federal legislation; Re Nakane and Okazake (1908),
13 B.C.R. 370 and Re Narain Singh et al (1908), 13 B.C.R. 477.

See infra, notes 165-68

and accompanying text. A finding of federal paramountcy is based on an assumption that the
provincial law is intra vires. Thus these decisions are implicitly at odds with the Minister of

Justice's interpretation of provincial power under section 95.
82 S.C. 1869, c. 10, s. 16.
83

Ibid, s. 11(2) (relating to "Lunatic, Idiotic, Deaf and Dumb, Blind or Infirm" persons).

84 S.C. 1872, c. 28, s. 10.
85 See infra, notes 183-90 and accompanying text.
86 Re Munshi Singh (1914), 20 B.C.R. 243 (CA)
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immigration restrictions related to class, character, and health,
suggesting that the Dominion's only concern was that prospective
immigrants, regardless of race, be capable of contributing to the
development of the wealth of the country.
In future years, federal Ministers of Justice occasionally
argued in other contexts that disallowance could be used for
"preventing the provincial legislatures from interfering with
Dominion policy in matters in which it is competent under the
constitution to the Dominion government to have a policy."8 7 It was
competent under the constitution for the Dominion to have an
immigration policy, and it had a policy of admitting immigrants of all
races. Thus, this theory would have justified the disallowance of BC
immigration legislation, even in the absence of an express conflict
with federal legislation. It is a theory that would have justified the
disallowance of any provincial immigration legislation, essentially
eliminating the*existence of concurrent provincial jurisdiction over
immigration under section 95. Perhaps for this reason, Minister of
Justice Campbell preferred to propound the theory that only
prohibitions on immigration were ultra vires a province in his 1884
report.
In any event, in his report on the 1884 Act, the Minister of
Justice went on to state that it was not necessary to reach a definite
conclusion regarding the scope of BC'S constitutional jurisdiction to
regulate immigration. Apart from the question of jurisdiction,
Campbell stated that the Act involved "Dominion and possibly
Imperial interests."88 For this reason, he was
clearly of opinion that it is an Act that ought not to be put into operation, without
due consideration, and without correspondence with the imperial authorities ...
As the Act clearly discriminates against the Chinese, and as it imposes great
penalties upon Chinamen coming into British Columbia, and upon those who assist
Chinamen to come to British Columbia, and as at least grave doubts must be

87 For an explanation of the disallowance of a P.E.I. statute in 1898, see "Report to the

Governor-General from Minister of Justice David Mills" in Gisborne & Fraser, supra, note
12, 762 at 764.

88 Hodgins, supra, note 12 at 1092.
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entertained as to the authority of the legislature to pass the Act, the undersigned
89

respectfully recommends that it be disallowed.

The Act was promptly disallowed by an order in council published
on 12 April 1884,9 prior to advice being received from the British
government regarding Imperial interests.
Upon hearing of the reasons given by the Minister of Justice
for the disallowance, the Earl of Derby, Secretary of State for the
colonies, informed the Governor-General by a letter dated 31 May
1884, that Imperial interests would not be affected by legislation
prohibiting Chinese immigration:
Her Majesty's government have not held that the relations of this country with
China require them to interfere with the Australian [anti-Chinese] legislation, and
it has been treated as a manner of internal administration, with which a responsible
colonial government is competent to deal. When, therefore, the Dominion
Ministers advise your lordship with regard to these Acts, you may understand that
the question is not held to involve imperial interests and that you should deal with
it as a Canadian interest only.91

Treaties and diplomatic relations with China could safely be ignored
so long as the country was rendered powerless by the occupying
European powers.
Throughout 1884, the federal government continued to
refuse to enact laws restricting Chinese immigration. Prime Minister
MacDonald responded to requests by BC Members of Parliament for
federal legislation prohibiting the entry of Chinese into Bc by
pledging to set up a Royal Commission to examine the whole
subject including "its trade relations, its social relations and all those

moral considerations which make Chinese immigration inadvisable."92
MacDonald believed, accurately as it turned out, that the result of
such a commission would be "restrictive regulation of Chinese
immigrants."93 In the meantime, MacDonald informed the House,
"there are certain contracts connected with the Canadian Pacific

89 Ibid. at 1092-93.
90

kid at 1093.

91 Ibid.
92 Canada, H.C Debates, vol. 16 at 1287 (2 April 1884).
93 Ibid.
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Railway which are to be finished, I suppose, next year; and I do not
think the Government could have made such satisfactory contracts
94
if it had been supposed that they could not get Chinese labour."
Once the railway was finished, he said, there would be "a flow into
that Province of our own race," and the anticipated arrival of
Europeans would obviate the "difficulty in supplying the wants of the
labour market."9 5 The evidence suggests that assuring an adequate
supply of cheap labour for the completion of the railway was the
true "Dominion and Imperial interest" that motivated the
disallowance of the 1884 BC Chinese Immigration Act.
As promised, the federal Royal Commission on Chinese
Immigration was appointed in July 1884, once completion of the CPR
was assured.96 The Commission's task was to consider "all those
moral considerations which it is alleged make Chinese immigration
undesirable,"97 with a view to determining the advisability of passing
a law to prohibit or restrict the immigration of Chinese persons to
Canada. The Commission's Report, released in February 1885,
recommended the imposition of a $10 head tax on Chinese
immigrants. In the Report, Commissioner Gray described Chinese
workers as "living machines," valuable for their contribution to the
rapid development of the country.98 He explained the Commission's
recommendation of a "judicious" and "moderate" policy of restriction
rather than prohibition in a manner consistent with MacDonald's
views:
There is not in the province of British Columbia the white labour to do the
required work. Yet the work must be done or the country must stand still. When
the white labour is so abundant that there is a reasonable fear that the country may
be injured by the competition, Parliament can legislate by exclusion, or otherwise,

94
95

Ibid.
Ibid.

96 Avery & Neary, supra, note 62 at 25; Ward, supra, note 9 at 38 and Wynne, supra,
note 9 at 366-71.
97

Report of the Royal Commission, supra, note 71 at vi.

98 Ibid at txx.
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to meet the occasion. There is no such fear at present, and the evidence shows the
occasion has not arisen. 9

Following the Report's recommendations, the federal government
passed the first Chinese ImmigrationAct,100 imposing a $50 head tax
that would come into force on 1 January 1886, after the completion
of the railway.
Meanwhile, in March 1885, Bc re-enacted An Act to Prevent
the Immigration of Chinese,10 1 in terms virtually identical to the
disallowed 1884 legislation. The Speaker of the Bc legislature, in a
letter to the Governor-General, regretted the disallowance of the
1884 Act on grounds of "expediency," and urged that restrictive
prevent our province from being completely
legislation be passed, "to
102
Chinese."
by
over-run
This would not be the last time that BC passed anti-Asian
legislation in the face of prior federal disallowance. Even if the
result was inevitable, it was not a completely futile exercise, for it
allowed the legislature to convey its determination both to Ottawa
and to the electorate. In addition, even if the Act was eventually
disallowed, it could be enforced in the time period between the
granting of royal assent by the Lieutenant-Governor and the
issuance of an order in council by the federal Cabinet. This time
period would last at least as long as it took for an authentic copy of
the legislation to be sent to Ottawa, and then anywhere from several
days to a year longer, following the receipt of the legislation by the
Secretary of State, depending on the importance of the issue to the
federal government.
In 1885, Minister of Justice Campbell could no longer rely
on imperial considerations to justify disallowance of the re-enacted
Chinese Immigration Act, London having informed him in 1884 that
there were no imperial objections to anti-Chinese legislation. 10 3 He
referred to his view that "the power given by the 95th section of the
99

kid at LNxcvi.

100 S.C 1885, c. 71.

101 S.B.C. 1885, c. 13.
102 Letter dated 3 March 1885, Hodgins, supra, note 12 at 1099.
103 See text accompanying note 91.
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British North America Act was a power to promote rather than
prevent immigration," but did not rely on it explicitly. Instead, he
concluded, after relying on American jurisprudence regarding the
scope of federal jurisdiction over commerce, that the Act had to be
disallowed on the grounds that it
is an interference with the power of Parliament to regulate trade and commerce,
and that it is a case in which the ordinary tribunals can afford no adequate remedy
for or protection
a ainst the injuries which will result from allowing the Act to go
... 104
into operation

The Minister based his argument that the legislation was in relation
to trade and commerce solely on American jurisprudence regarding
the scope of the power of Congress to regulate commerce. He did
not mention that in 1881, the Privy Council in the Parsons case 105
had embarked on a much more restrictive interpretation of
Parliament's jurisdiction over trade and commerce than that taken
by the United States Supreme Court. The Minister's argument that
the Chinese Immigration Act was ultra vires the BC legislature was
not compelling, suggesting either that the federal government was
resisting the Privy Council's restrictive interpretation of its powers in
Parsons, or that the real reasons for disallowance were not
articulated.
In reality, there was little doubt that this legislation, as was
the case with the 1884 Act, would be disallowed given the railway
contractors' continuing need to import Chinese labour. In February
1885, the leading CPR contractor in the west, Andrew Onderdonk,
had written to George Stephen, the president of the CPR, requesting
that any BC legislation be disallowed immediately to save him any
embarrassment in bringing 2,000 Chinese men over the border from
Oregon and California.106 Stephen then wrote to MacDonald
warning that if the Act was "not promptly disallowed the CPR [could
104 Hodgins, supra, note 12 at 1101.
105 Citizens Insurance Co. v. Parsons (1881), 7 App. Cas. 96, 1 Cart. 265 (P.C.)

[hereinafter Parsons].
106 Woodsworth, supra, note 42 at 34; P. Roy, "A Choice Between Evils: The Chinese
and the Construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway in British Columbia" in H.A. Dempsey,
ed., The CPR West The Iron Road and the Making of a Nation (Vancouver Douglas and
McIntyre, 1984) at 32.
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not] possibly be finished this year."1° 7 Ottawa had anticipated the
passage of the Act and asked the Lieutenant-Governor to forward
a copy to Ottawa as quickly as possible1 08 Within weeks of the
legislation's passage on 9 March 1885, the Chinese Consolidated
Benevolent Association of Victoria, formed the year before to
defend the interests of Chinese persons in BC, wrote to the
Secretary of State pointing out that the Act was being enforced to
turn back Chinese persons arriving at Victoria, and requesting that
the Act be disallowed at once. 1 9 A copy of the legislation arrived
in Ottawa on 23 March 1885.110 Onderdonk, who was in Portland
recruiting workers, sent a telegram to the Minister of Justice on 25
March stating: "Am waiting here for disallowance Chinese Act.
Please telegraph me, soon as action taken."1' 1 2 The Act was
disallowed by Order in Council three days later

107 Roy, ibid at 32.
108 See Canada, H.C., "Letter from Secretary of State J.A. Chapleau to the LieutenantGovernor" No. 21 in Sessional Papers (1888) (vol. 16 at 280 of the paper).
109 bid at 281-82.
110

Ibid at 290.

111 Ibid at 283.
112 Ibid at 288 and C. Gaz. 1885.XVIII.1569. Curiously, the Act was twice disallowed
by order in council. Another report, written on 11 March 1886 by Sir John Thompson, the
new Minister of Justice who succeeded Alexander Campbell, recommended disallowance of
the already disallowed 1885 Chinese Immigration Act. He reasoned that "there are stronger
reasons now for the disallowance of the Act' than there were for the disallowance of the 1884
Act given that the federal Chinese Immigration Act had been passed in the 1885 session.
Hodgins, supra, note 12 at 1101. Now the federal government could justify disallowance on
paramountcy grounds rather than on questionable arguments that the legislation was ultra vires
the BC legislature. Pursuant to the Minister's recommendation, an Order in Council
disallowing the Act was issued on 16 March 1886, seven days before the one year time period
for disallowance would have expired. Canada, H.C., No. 21 in Sessional Papers(1888) at 28889 and C. Gaz. 1886XIX.1686. One can only surmise that the change in Justice Ministers
was responsible for this second disallowance being carried out oblivious to the fact that the
Act had already been disallowed a year earlier.
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C. Disallowance of the 1900-1908 British Columbia Immigration Acts
The BC government did not pass legislation prohibiting Asian
immigration again until the turn of the century. There was very
little Chinese or Japanese immigration in the late 1880s and early
1890s. The Chinese population in the province was in decline until
the early 1890s, partly a result of the federal head tax, and partly
attributable to the high unemployment and destitution that many
Chinese workers faced in the years following the completion of the
CPR. The Chinese population grew from 8,910 in 1891 to 14,628 in
1901, with the bulk of the increase occurring in 1899 and 1900 when
113
over 4,000 Chinese entered in each year.
Japanese immigration to BC was insubstantial prior to the
mid-1880s. 114 Like the Chinese, Japanese immigrants were almost
exclusively young men.! 15 Some came to work as contract labourers
in the coal mines, others worked in the logging industry, while close
to half of the Japanese population worked in the Fraser River
fishery by the turn of the century.1 16 The Japanese population of
the province was negligible in 1891, increasing to 1,000 by 1896 and
to 4,544 in 1901.117 By the early-1890s, the Japanese immigrants
had attracted the attention of European inhabitants who were
fearful of Japanese labour competition. From 1895 on, legislated
anti-Asian policies, such as exclusions from employment and the
franchise, were directed at the Japanese and Chinese alike.
Apart from the relatively low levels of immigration, the
absence of any further BC immigration legislation prior to the turn
of the century can be attributed to the fact that the legislature, until
the late 1890s, was controlled by MLAS who were more sympathetic
to the desires of employers than they were to the demands of the
rising organized white labour movement in BC. Nevertheless, further

113 Roy, supra, note 9 at 92.
114 Adachi, supra, note 9 at 13; Roy, supra, note 9 at 81-88.
115 Adachi, ibid. at 17 & 28-29.
116 IbM. at 26-27.
117 Roy, supra, note 9 at 92.
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restrictions on Asian immigration continued to be raised as an issue
in the legislature through the 18908.118

At the 1897 Colonial Conference, Joseph Chamberlain,
Secretary of State for the colonies, expressed concern about the

possible passage of anti-Asian immigration legislation in BC. He
stressed the need to maintain imperial relations and trade. He
suggested the adoption of legislation along the lines of the Natal
Act, named after the British colony in South Africa, which had
excluded non-white immigrants by the application of a European
language test, rather than an explicit racial exclusion. He had
apparently been assured by M. Kato, the Japanese Minister in
London, that such legislation would not be objected to since it was
not discriminatory on its face.119 In 1898, Chamberlain noted that
discriminatory legislation is "extremely repugnant" to the people of
Japan, and suggested that any threat of "a large influx of Japanese
labourers into Canada" be dealt with by restrictive legislation along
the lines of the Natal Act "which is likely to be generally adopted in
Australia. 120 He argued that Japan took offence to "their exclusion
nominatim," but would not object to an "educational test."121

118 In 1891, the legislature passed a resolution requesting the federal government to
make the ChineseInigrationAct more restrictive, by increasing the head tax to $100. British
Columbia, Legislative Assembly, "Restriction of Chinese Immigration" in Sessional Papers
(1892) at 627. A similar resolution was transmitted to the federal government in 1893. The
federal Minister of Trade and Commerce replied that "in view of the commercial relations of
Canada with China and its possible extension, it is not expedient to change the provisions of
the Chinese Immigration Act as it at present exists, nor to take any action that might be
construed by the Chinese government as unfriendly thereto..." British Columbia, Legislative
Assembly, "Correspondence Re Chinese Per Capita Tax' in Sessional Papers (1894) at 1004.
In 1897, the BC legislature requested that the federal government amend the
Naturalization Act to extend the period of residence required prior to naturalization from
three to ten years for Japanese and Chinese immigrants. British Columbia, LegislativeJournal
(30 April 1897) at 141. This request was refused on the grounds that it would constitute a
violation of treaties with China and Japan. BC also requested that the head tax be increased
and that BC receive three quarters of the revenue from the tax, "as the chief injury from the
presence of the Chinese is sustained by the Province, and not by the Dominion." British
Columbia, Legislative Journal (23 February 1897) at 34.
119 Woodsworth, supra, note 42 at 53-54.
120 Gisborne & Fraser, supra, note 12 at 542-43.
121 AIk at 555.
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On 31 August 1900, three weeks after Japan had announced
voluntary restrictions on emigration to Canada,122 BC passed the
Immigration Act 123 that made it unlawful for any person to
immigrate to British Columbia if that person failed to fill out an
application "in the characters of some language of Europe" when
asked to do so by an officer, as the Colonial Office had suggested.
The legislation was drafted in a manner that attempted to avoid any
conflict with Dominion legislation that would give rise to federal
paramountcy. Section 2(f) provided that the Act did not apply to
"any persons the terms of whose entry into Canada have been fixed,
or whose exclusion from Canada has been ordered by any Act of
the Parliament of Canada." The Dominion had set the terms of
entry of Chinese immigrants by imposing a $50 head tax in 1885,
increased to $100 in 1900.124 As a result, Chinese immigrants were
not subject to the terms of the BC Immigration Act.
The legislature's partial deference to Dominion immigration
policy blunted the legal objections to the Act, but the diplomatic
problems raised by the restriction of Japanese immigration remained.
The Japanese Consul in Vancouver, S. Shimizu, objected to the Act,
stating that the language test was a guise for the true purpose of
prohibiting Japanese immigration into the province. It certainly
seemed unlikely that provincial immigration officers would use the
legislation to exclude illiterate Europeans. As the Japanese Consul
put it, the language test is not
a test of the vernacular language of this province, because other European
languages than the English are admitted for the test ... It is scarcely necessary to
point out that the object of this Bill is to prohibit immigration of Japanese into this
25
province, as Chinese are made to be exempted from the application of this Act.

Chamberlain's hopes that the legislation would be acceptable to
Japan were thus dashed. Chamberlain urged the federal government
to disallow the Act on the grounds that it was ultra vires the

122 Woodsworth, supra, note 42 at 60-61.
123 S.B.C 1900, c. 11.
124 Chinese Inmiadon Acq 1900, S.C. 1900, c. 32.

125 Gisborne & Fraser, supra, note 12 at 588.
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province in terms very similar to those articulated by Justice Minister
Campbell in 1884:
The whole scheme of the British North America Act implies the exclusive exercise
by the Dominion of all "national" powers, and though the power to legislate for the
promotion and encouragement of immigration into the provinces may have been
properly given to the provincial legislatures, the right of entry into Canada of
persons voluntarily seeldng such entry is obviously a purely national 12
matter,
6
affecting as it does directly the relations of the Empire with foreign states.

Unlike the situation in 1884,127 Asian immigration was an Imperial

issue now that Japanese rather than Chinese were the target of BC'S
immigration prohibition. As Chamberlain stated, it "is the particular
desire of His Majesty's government to do nothing especially
at the
128
present time to impair existing relations with Japan."'
In his report dated 5 January 1901, Minister of Justice David
Mills recommended disallowance of the Act on the grounds of the
paramountcy of federal immigration policy:
[A]s parliament has already legislated with regard to the subject of immigration, and
has not seen fit to impose any educational requirement whatever, the present Act
seems inconsistent with the general policy of the law, and the undersigned considers
that in cases where foreign relations are involved, it is not at present desirable that
the uniformity of the immigration laws should be interfered with by special
provincial legislation/29

Even though the BC Immigration Act did not apply to federally
regulated classes of immigrants, by excluding Japanese immigrants
it nevertheless ran afoul of the Dominion's general "open-door"
immigration policy. Nor was the Minister willing to let the courts
decide whether the Act was valid and operative:
[I]n view of the objections raised by Japanese consul, and other similar objections
which may arise in the operation or administration
of the Act, it would be
13 0
inadvisable to leave this Act to its operation.

126 IM at 599.
127 See text accompanying note 91.
128 Canada, H.C., "Chinese and Japanese Immigration" No. 74b in SessionalPapers(19078) (vol. 18 at 66 & 70).
129 Gisborne & Fraser, supra, note 12 at 595.
130 Ibid at 596.
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No immediate action was taken on the grounds that the BC
government was considering amending the legislation to "remove the
grounds of objection taken on behalf of the government of
Japan."13 1 The BC government however, was vigorously enforcing
the Act, and had no apparent intention of changing its policy.
Moreover, a BC executive Committee sent a report to Ottawa in
March 1901 requesting that federal immigration legislation be
passed, incorporating "an educational test, similar to that imposed in
the colony of Natal."132 The federal government was constrained by
Imperial policy from pursuing this course,133 although Prime Minister
Laurier was willing to increase the head tax on Chinese immigration
to $100, effective 1 January 1901,134 and promised to appoint a
Royal Commission to investigate Chinese and Japanese
immigration.135 After receiving further clarification from the
Colonial Office on Imperial policy, a report of the Minister of
Justice, dated 4 September 1901, recommended disallowance
again l 36 The Act was finally disallowed on 11 September 1901,137
less than a week before the deadline,1 38 after it had been in force
13 9
and rigorously enforced by provincial authorities for nine months.

131 Letter from Minister of Justice David Mills to the Governor General (5 March 1901),
ibid. at 596.
132 Gisborne & Fraser, supra, note 12 at 601.
133 Prime Minister Laurier would sanction no interference with Japanese immigration
because of Imperial policy. He hoped that the people of BC "will be prepared to put no
obstacle in the way of an alliance between Japan and England; and although it may call for
sacrifice on their part, they will be prepared to make that sacrifice for the sake of the mother
country and for the sake of a united empire." Eastern MPs supported these sentiments: see
Canada, H.C Debates (1900) at 7055-56, 7412, 8174 & 8199-8205.
134 Supra, note 124.
135 Canada, H.C Debates (1900) at 7407-11, 8201-14.
136 Gisborne & Fraser, supra, note 12 at 604.
137 P.C. 1901-1741, C. Gaz. 1901.XXXV.455.
138 The Act had been received by the Secretary of State on 17 September 1900; see
Gisborne & Fraser, supra, note 12 at 600.
139 See the reports of the provincial immigration officers reproduced in British Columbia,
Legislative Assembly, SessionalPapers (1902) at 849ff. The reports indicate that the officers
successfully tracked down and sent back Japanese and Chinese immigrants who could not pass
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Given the uncertainty about what Imperial relations with
Japan required in 1900, disallowance was exercised in 1901 only
after a series of communications between representatives of the
Imperial, Dominion, provincial and Japanese governments in
Victoria, Ottawa and London. While in 1884-85 disallowance of BC'S
Chinese Immigration Acts was an assertion of the primacy of
Dominion labour policy, at the turn of the century it was BC'S
doubly subordinate position within the hierarchy of state interests as a colony within a colony - which led to the disallowance of its
anti-Asian statutes.
As promised, a federal Royal Commission on Chinese and
Japanese Immigration was appointed in September 1901. Its 1902
Report recommended that further Chinese immigration be effectively
prohibited by raising the head tax to $500. The commissioners were
of the opinion that voluntary restriction on Japanese emigration by
the Japanese government precluded the need for restrictive
Canadian action. 140 However, in the event that the Japanese
government changed its policy, the Commissioners recommended the
adoption of a Natal Act to limit Japanese immigration which was
more "dangerous" to the "welfare of the [white] working man" than
Chinese immigration.1 41
The BC legislature passed another Immigration Act in June
1902 virtually identical to the 1900 Act disallowed nine months

the language test from the Act's coming into force until its disallowance on 11 September
1901.

The Act appeared to be enforced against Chinese persons notwithstanding the

exemption in section 2(f) of the Act. The immigration officer for the island district, W.H.
Ellis, delivered his final report of the legislation's operation on 30 September 1901. He noted
that transportation companies had been successfully persuaded to refuse passage to Asian
immigrants who could not pass the test. He regretted the Act's disallowance, for the Act had
"accomplished all that was sought for it in its being placed on the statute books, viz., the
staying of an undesirable immigration that gave promise of working a serious menace to the
best interests of the Province." "Reports of Immigration Officers Under Act of 1900" (30
September 1901), ibid. at 853.
140 Canada, H.C., "Report of the Royal Commission" No. 54 in Sessional Papers (1902)
vol. 13 at 1-430.
141 lbhi at 397.
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earlier 42 The Japanese Consul General, Mr Nosse, requested that
this "obnoxious" law be disallowed immediately:
[S]hould this Bill come into force, the Japanese will be totally deprived of their

treaty right of free entry into Canada ... this legislation even for a moment left in
force, will most injuriously interfere with the free movement of all classes of
Japanese in general, the consequence of it will eventually lead to jeopardizing of
trade relations
between Japan and Canada, in which British Columbia is particularly
43
interested.

Minister of Justice Charles Fitzpatrick's report, dated 14 November
1902, recommended disallowance for the same reasons expressed in
the report on the disallowance of the 1900 Act.144 It was disallowed
on 5 December 1902, after it had been in force for six months. In
the House of Commons on 27 March 1903, the Dominion
government was pressed to justify why it had resorted to
disallowance rather than leaving the validity of the Act to be
determined by the courts. The Minister of Justice relied on the
view expressed by his predecessor in 1884 that the Act was ultra
vires.145 Prime Minister Laurier, on the other hand, was more
sensitive to the political need to distinguish Dominion intervention
in this case from other instances, like the Manitoba schools crisis,
where he had relied on provincial rights to justify federal nonintervention.
Rather than relying on the theory that BC'S
Immigration Act was ultra vires, a theory that could just as well be
determined by the courts as by the federal executive, he emphasized
the importance of maintaining friendly and profitable relations with
Japan. 146 He stated that the Dominion government had informed
the BC legislature

142 S.B.C. 1902, c. 34. Like its predecessor, the Act rendered unlawful the immigration

into BC of any person unable to complete an application in a language of Europe (section
4). In addition, the exemption of persons whose right of entry had been regulated by
Dominion legislation was continued by section 3(f).
143 Gisborne & Fraser, supra, note 12 at 635.
144

Ibid at 638.

145 Canada, H.C Debates at 604-7 (27 March 1903).
146

bid at 602-3.
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that if they were to restrict their action to Chinese immigration, that if they were
leaving
interfere,
to except Japanese immigrants from their legislation, we would not 14
7

them to exercise their own will in regard to Chinese immigration.

The manner in which disallowance was exercised made it
worthwhile for Bc to re-enact legislation in the face of the inevitable
constitutional rebuke from Ottawa. The regular re-enactment of
anti-Asian legislation through 1908 in the face of repeated federal
disallowance was largely a symbolic ritual sending out a variety of
signals: to Asians, that they were not welcome; to Ottawa, that it
ought to direct attention to the issue;148 and to voters in Bc
demanding Asian exclusion, that the provincial government was
making a serious attempt to block Asian immigration. In addition,
the ex post facto operation of the disallowance power allowed the
Acts to function temporarily. At the time of the construction of the
CPR, the federal government had disallowed BC'S immigration
restrictions without delay, given the urgency of guaranteeing a supply
of labour. At the turn of the century, the Cabinet moved slowly.
Indeed, it often seemed to drag its heels deliberately. The delays in
disallowing anti-Asian legislation could not have been the result of
inadvertence, as the Japanese Consul wrote forceful protests against
such delays and the consequent damage to relations with Japan. 49
Disallowance was exercised almost reluctantly, in order to preserve
diplomatic relations with Japan. The formal or symbolic affirmation
of intolerance of provincial anti-Asian laws appears to have been
more important to the Dominion government than actually doing
anything to protect prospective Japanese immigrants. Frequently,
the period between enactment and disallowance was longer than the
period that followed between disallowance and reenactment. As a
147

bkid at 603.

148 See, for example, "Letter from Premier Dunsmuir to Prime Minister Laurier," supra,
note 128 at 56. After conceding that BC legislation passed in the 1900 session might be
unconstitutional, the Premier stated: "What I feel particularly is this, that an unquestionable
remedy lies with the Dominion authorities, and having promised the House that we would use
our utmost influence with your government, and through the Dominion government with the

Imperial authorities, to bring about a settlement, I cannot too strongly urge upon your
attention the great desirability of dealing effectively with our representations." Canada, No.74b
in Sessional Papers (1907-8) at 56.
149 See, for example, the letter from Mr. Nosse to the Governor General reproduced in
Gisborne & Fraser, supra, note 12 at 645.
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result, in the period from 1900 to 1908, BC anti-Asian Immigration
Acts were in force more often than not. The change in Dominion
practice from 1884-85 to the later 1900-1908 period is an indication
of the declining commitment of the Dominion government to an
"open-door" immigration policy.
The number of European
immigrants arriving in Canada was increasing significantly by the turn
of the century. The Dominion government no longer faced a choice
of Asian labour or no labour at all.
Early in 1903, a federal bill was introduced to implement the
Royal Commission's recommendation that the head tax on Chinese

immigration be increased to $500. The new law came into effect on
1 January 1904,150 and virtually eliminated Chinese immigration for
the next few years.1 51
In May 1903, the BC legislature re-enacted the previously
disallowed Immigration Act with its exclusion of all persons unable
to complete a form in a language of Europe when asked to do so
by an officer, 5 2 The Act was disallowed, but not until 26 March
1904.!53 The ritual continued with the re-enactment of slightly
altered legislation in April 190454 that was disallowed in January
1905.155 Shortly after the January disallowance, the BC legislature
re-enacted the identical Act.!5 6 This time the Act was disallowed
promptly, in April 1905, almost as soon as it had reached Ottawa,

150 The Chinese Immigration Ac 1903, S.C. 1903, c. 8.
151 See figures in Roy, supra, note 9 at 270.
152 Bish Columbia Immigration Acq 1903, S.B.C. 1903, c. 12.
153 The Minister of Justice recommended disallowance in three separate reports dated
5 June 1903, 1 October 1903, and 8 January 1904. Gisborne & Fraser, supra, note 12 at
643-44.
154 Brith Columbia Immigration Ac 1904, S.B.C. 1904, c. 26. The Act prohibited the
immigration into BC of any person "who fails to write out at dictation ... a passage of fifty
words in length, in an European language, directed by the officer" (section 3); classes of
immigrants regulated by Dominion legislation were excluded (section 4(g)).
155 See Gisborne & Fraser, supra, note 12 at 659-60 for a copy of the Minister's report
recommending disallowance following "the course adopted on previous occasions."
156

Brith Columbia ImmigrationAct 1905, S.B.C. 1905, c. 28.
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reflecting the growing impatience of the federal, British and
157
Japanese governments with BC'S annual "farce."

After a brief respite in the 1906 legislative session, the
legislature passed another immigration bill in 1907.!58 Lieutenant-

Governor Dunsmuir reserved assent, apparently acting on his own,
without Dominion or Imperial advice. Dunsmuir explained to the
Secretary of State that the bill was "but a modified form of other
Acts dealing with the same subject" that had been previously
disallowed, and that the Bill "might seriously interfere with our
international relations and Federal interests."1 59 The federal
Minister of Justice refused to recommend that royal assent be given
to the Bill.160 Feelings against Dunsmuir amongst voters ran high
- he had for many years been a leading employer of Asian labour
in his coal mines. He was burned in effigy during the Vancouver
anti-Asian riots that occurred in September 1907.161
157 See Roy, supra, note 9 at 162-63. The growing irritation of the Minister of Justice
is evident in his report of 19 April 1905 recommending disallowance of the Immigration Act
and other anti-Asian laws passed that session: "The undersigned does not consider it
expedient that the present enactments should remain in force, and the fact that the assembly
continues to re-enact these statutes after full discussion, and after they have been several times
disallowed, shows that it would be a mere waste of time to communicate with the Provincial
Government with a view to repeal or modification of these Acts at the hands of the assembly."
Gisborne & Fraser, supra, note 12 at 664.
158 British Columbia Immigration Act 1907, S.B.C. 1907, c. 21A. It prohibited the
immigration into BC of any person unable to fill out an application form in English or any
other language of Europe (section 4). Members of a class of immigrants regulated by
Dominion legislation were exempted from the operation of the Act (section 3(O ) .
159 British Columbia, Legislative Assembly, "Correspondence Re Bill No. 30, 1907" in
Sessional Papers (1908) (at D-44).
160 Report dated 27 November 1907. Gisborne & Fraser, supra, note 12 at 690.
161 The rioters did not know that at the time of his reservation of the 1907 Immigration
Act, Dunsmuir was negotiating with the Canadian Nippon Supply Company to import up to
five hundred Japanese men to work in his coal mines. British Columbia, Legislative Journal
(1908) at 7-8; Roy, supra, note 9 at 169. For full accounts of the 1907 riot, see Adachi,
supra, note 9; Comack, supra, note 56; M.E. Hallett, "A Governor-General's Views on Oriental
Immigration to British Columbia, 1904-1911" (1972) 14 BC Stud. 51; M. lino, "Japan's
Reaction to the Vancouver Riot of 1907" (1983-84) 60 BC Stud. 28; P.E. Roy, 'The
Preservation of the Peace in Vancouver. The Aftermath of the Anti-Chinese Riot of 1887"
(1976) 31 BC Stud. 44; Roy, supra, note 9, at 185-226 and H.H. Sugimoto, "I'he Vancouver
Riots of 1907: A Canadian Episode" in H. Conroy & T.S. Miyakawa, eds, East Across the
Pacific: Historicaland Sociological Studies of Japanese Immigration and Assimilation (Santa
Barbara: American Bibliographic Center - Cleo Press, 1972) 92.
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As a result of the deference it paid to Britain's military and
commercial alliance with Japan, Canada was constrained from
passing overtly discriminatory legislation against the Japanese as it
had against the Chinese. The only way of satisfying the anti-Asian
sentiment of voters was to renegotiate Japan's voluntary restrictions
on emigration. Following the Vancouver anti-Asian riot, Adolphe
Lemieux, the Minister of Labour, was appointed to discuss the issue
in Tokyo with the British Ambassador and the Japanese authorities.
In the resulting Lemieux Agreement (or "Gentleman's Agreement"),
announced in the House of Commons on 21 January 1908, Japan
agreed to limit the number of emigration passports62issued to workers
and domestic servants to four hundred annually
In February 1908, the BC legislature passed another
immigration act with a European language test,1 63 its final attempt,
as it turned out, to pass legislation rendering Asian immigration
unlawful. The only difference between this Act and the six earlier
versions passed between 1900 and 1907 was the removal of the
exemption for persons whose right of entry was regulated by
Dominion legislation. The passage of the first sweeping Dominion
Immigration Act 164 in 1906 meant that the British Columbia
ImmigrationAct might not have operated with respect to any Asian
immigrants if the exemption that had appeared in previous BC Acts
had been retained.
Several weeks after its passage, a BC court
held that the 1908 British Columbia Immigration Act was
unenforceable against Japanese subjects,1 65 as it was inconsistent
with the paramount federal Japanese Treaty Ac4 1907,166 which gave
effect to the provisions of the 1894 Treaty between Great Britain
and Japan.167 In a subsequent case involving a charge against a

162 Adachi, supra, note 9 at 81 and Avery & Neary, supra, note 62 at 28-29.
163

Bith Columbia Immigration Ac 1908, S.B.C. 1908, c. 23, s. 30.

164 S.C. 1906, c. 19.
165

Re Nakane and Okazake, supra, note 81.

166 S.C. 1907, . 50.
16 7

Article 1 of the 1894 Treaty provided that the subjects of each party shall have "full
liberty to enter, travel or reside in any part of the dominions and possessions of the other
Contracting Party, and shall enjoy full and perfect protection for their person and property."
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number of south Asian immigrants, the BC Supreme Court held that
the British Columbia ImmigrationAct was inoperative in its entirety
because the federal government had "occupied the field" by enacting
a "complete code" to regulate immigration in the 1906 Dominion
Immigration Act. 168 For good measure, the Act was disallowed in
February 1909.169
The two 1908 court decisions were the first to consider the
constitutionality of a BC anti-Asian immigration law. In neither case
did the judges discuss the federal government's theory that the
provinces lacked the constitutional authority to prohibit immigration
into the province.
Rather, they seemed to assume that the
provincial Act was intra vires and would be operative in the absence
of federal legislation. 1 70 As the results in the cases were based
squarely on federal paramountcy resulting from a conflict with the
Dominion ImmigrationAct of 1906 and the Japanese Treaty Act of
1907, the reasoning in the cases suggests that previous Bc
immigration acts were constitutionally valid and would have
operated, prior to the enactment of the 1906 federal Act, were it
not for federal disallowance.
By 1908, changes in immigration patterns and consequent
changes in federal laws made it unnecessary for BC to pass any
further legislation restricting Asian immigration. The long-standing
federal policy of recruiting European settlers had begun to pay off
by the turn of the century.
Canada's economy experienced
unprecedented growth from 1896 to 1911. The price of Canadian

Supra, notes 42-44 and accompanying text. By Article 1 of the Convention of 31 January
1906, the parties agreed that the stipulations of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation
between Great Britain and Japan of 16 July 1894, shall be applied to the intercourse,
commerce and navigation between the Empire of Japan and the British Dominion of Canada.
168 Re Narain Singh et aL, supra, note 81.

One of the powers contained in the 1906

federal Act was the power to define classes of persons who are excluded as potential

immigrants. See supra, note 164, s. 30.
169 In his report dated 19 November 1908, the Minister of Justice recommended

disallowance for the reasons given for earlier incarnations of the Act, and for the additional
reason that it was repugnant to the 1907 Japanese Treaty Act. The Act was accordingly
disallowed on 15 February 1909. See Gisborne & Fraser, supra, note 12 at 691-92.
170 See the decisions of Irving J. in Re Nakane and Okazake, supra, note 81 at 373 and

of Hunter C.J. in Re Naran Singh et aL, supra, note 81 at 480.
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exports rose, a national transportation infrastructure was in place,
and the federal governments policy of entering into treaties with the
First Nations facilitated European settlement of aboriginal lands. As
a result, plenty of good agricultural land was available for settlement,
while by the turn of the century, there was not such an equivalent
abundance of quality land in the United States. Minister of the
Interior Clifford Sifton aggressively developed existing schemes for
recruiting European immigrants by advertising, providing land give171
aways and giving bonuses to transportation companies.
Promotional policies were also directed at European farmers in the
United States.' 72 Beginning in 1903, immigration levels reflected the
growing success of this policy. Immigration to Canada had hovered
around 30,000 persons per year in the 1890s; it jumped to an
average in excess of 200,000 per year from 1903 to 1914, reaching
a high of 400,870 in 1913.173 While the number of emigrants had
exceeded the number of immigrants in each decade after
Confederation prior to the turn of the century, immigrants
outnumbered emigrants by more than 700,000 from 1900 to 1910.174
As a result, federal policy makers no longer found it necessary to
keep the doors open to Asian immigration. There was now an
abundance of "more desirable" European labour. In addition, the
massive expansion of demand for an unskilled labour force that had
was beginning
accompanied late nineteenth century industrialization
1 75
century.
the
of
turn
the
by
down
slow
to
Federal restrictions on Asian immigration coincided with
these changes in immigration patterns and the needs of the labour
market. The federal government first restricted Chinese immigration
by increasing the head tax to $100 in 1900 and to $500 in 1903, and
then virtually eliminated further Chinese immigration in 1923 with
171 Troper, supra, note 58; Avery, supra, note 62 and Imai, supra, note 62; Cameron,
supra, note 58.
172 Troper, supra, note 58.
173 G.E. Dirks, Canada's Refugee Policy: Indifference or Opportunism? (Montreal:
McGill-Queen's University Press, 1977) at 259.
174

Avery, supra, note 62 at 193 and D.M. McDougall, "Immigration into Canada" (1961)

27 Cdn. 3. of Ec. Pol. Sci. 162.

175 Creese, supra, note 9 at 71.

1991]

Racism and the Constitution

the passage of the Chinese Immigration Ac4 1923.176

669

The Act

excluded Chinese from entering the country except those that fell

within one of four narrowly defined exceptions for diplomats,
children born in Canada of Chinese parents, merchants or students.
Until its repeal in 1947,177 the Act blocked further immigration of
Chinese workers and affirmed the inferior status of Chinese already
in the country.

Japanese immigration was limited to 400 workers per year by
the Lemieux Agreement of 1908. This agreement remained in force
until the early 1920s, when negotiations began between Canada and
Japan to further restrict Japanese immigration. In 1923, Japan
agreed to further restrict the emigration of labourers to 150
annually.1 78
South Asian immigration was effectively halted by the 1908
orders in council providing that an immigrant could enter Canada
only if he or she came by continuous passage from his or her
country of birth or citizenship, 179 and requiring landing money of at
least $25 cash in summer or $50 in winter1t ° The only through

176 S.C. 1923, c. 38. In addition, Order in Council, P.C. 1923-1272, C. Gaz.
1923.LVII.277, passed under the Act on 10 July 1923, required the registration of all Chinese
living in Canada.
1 77

An Act to Amend the ImmigrationAct and to Repeal the Chinese Immigration Act S.C.

1947, c. 19.
178 Bolaria & Li, supra, note 46 at 135 and Adachi, supra, note 9 at 137-38: "King and
his Liberals, meanwhile, walked the slippery diplomatic tightrope of attempting to appease
British Columbia and of not offending Japan, from whom Canada was profiting handsomely
in terms of increasing trade and exports."
179 P.C. 1908-27, 8 January 1908.
18 0

P.C. 1908-28, 8 January 1908. These orders were struck down as beyond the powers
delegated to the Minister by the legislation: see Re Behari Lai et aL (1908), 13 B.C.R. 415.
Shortly after this decision, both orders were rewritten to impose the continuous journey and
landing money requirements: P.C. 1908-662 & P.C. 1908-656 (27 March 1908). In addition,
the ImmigrationAct was amended to make it clear that the imposition of these requirements
was permitted; S.C. 1908, c. 33, s. 1. Pursuant to this new provision, a new continuous
journey order (P.C. 1908-932, 27 May 1908) and a new landing money order were passed
(P.C. 1908-1255, 3 June 1908), the latter increasing the landing money requirement to $200.
These orders were subsequently replaced by P.C. 1910-920 & P.C. 1910-926 passed on 9
May 1910. These orders were held invalid in In Re Narain Singh (1913), 18 B.C.R. 506.
They were again rewritten as P.C. 1914-23 & P.C. 1914-24, C. Gaz. 1914.XLVII.2335 (7
January 1914) and upheld in Re Munshi Singh (1914), 20 B.C.R. 243.
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passage from India to Canada was by Canadian Pacific steamer, and
a government directive sent to cP outlets in India prohibited the sale
of through passage tickets1 81 Later, when direct journeys by sea
to Vancouver became commonplace, and "having regard to the
unemployment conditions now existing in Canada," an order was
passed excluding "any immigrant of Asiatic race" except farmers,
farm labourers, female domestic servants, and "the wife and child
under 18 years of age of any person legally admitted to and resident
in Canada, who is in a position to receive and care for his
dependents."182
The demands of voters in BC were further accommodated in
the federal regulatory scheme by the passage of an order in council
on 8 December 1913 dealing specifically with the arrival of
immigrant workers in BC. The order stated that "in view of the
present overcrowded condition of the labour market in British
Columbia," the landing at designated ports of entry in British
Columbia of "any immigrant ... artisans [or] labourers ... is hereby

prohibited."18 3 In this way, the Dominion government demonstrated
not
that its assertion of exclusive control over immigration 1did
84
preclude the consideration of the concerns of voters in BC.

181 Imai, supra, note 62 at 94-95; Avery & Neary, supra, note 62 at 30; Ward, supra, note
9 at 86 and Adachi, supra, note 9 at 96.
182 P.C. 1923-182, C. Gaz. 1923.LVIA106 (31 January 1923).
183 P.C. 1913-2642, C. Gaz. 1913.XLVII.1865 (8 December 1913). This policy was
continued by the following orders in council: P.C. 1914-897, C. Gaz. 1914.XLVII.3654 (31
March 1914); P.C. 1914-2455, C. Gaz. 1914.XLVIII.1183 (26 September 1914); P.C. 1915565, C. Gaz. 1915.XLVIII.3094 (13 March 1915); P.C. 1915-2295, C. Gaz. 1915.XLIX.1063
(30 September 1915); P.C. 1916-488, C. Gaz. 1916.XLIX.3214 (3 March 1916); P.C. 19162195, C. Gaz. 1916.L.1318 (19 September 1916); P.C. 1917-849, C. Gaz 1917.L.3484 (29
March 1917); P.C. 1917-2630, C. Gaz. 1917.LI.1250 (28 September 1917); P.C. 1918-855, C.
Gaz. 1918.LI.4216 (10 April 1918); P.C. 1918-1183, C. Gaz. 1918.LI.4216 (18 May 1918); P.C.
1919-1202, C. Gaz. 1919.LII.3824 (9 June 1919).
184 The effectiveness of the federal orders was dramatically demonstrated in May 1914.
The steamship Komagata Maru arrived in Vancouver with 376 prospective south Asian
immigrants, but was forced to leave after the BC Court of Appeal upheld the validity of the
federal Act and executive orders: see Re Munshi Singh, supra, note 180. For accounts of the
Komagata Maru incident, see H. Johnston, The Voyage of the Komagata Maru: The Sikh
Challenge to Canada'sColour Bar (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1979) and T. Ferguson,
A White Man's Country: An Exercise in CanadianPrejudice(Toronto: Doubleday, 1975).
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By 1906, the increase in European immigration and changing
needs of the labour market meant that the federal government could
afford to abandon its open door immigration policy in favour of a
selective policy that favoured able-bodied Europeans and excluded
everyone else.
The 1906 Immigration Act 85 expanded and
systematized the prohibited classes of immigrants, which had
previously been developed on an ad hoc basis.' 8 6 By section 30,
Cabinet was empowered to make orders prohibiting the landing in
Canada of any specified class of immigrant. For the first time,
powers of deportation were included in the legislation.'7 Officers
were appointed and boards of inquiry established to administer the
Act.18' The broad discretionary powers conferred on the federal
executive to control the flow of immigration was continued and
clarified in the 1910 ImmigrationAct.'8 9 Sections 38(a) and (b) set
out the authority to pass orders imposing the continuous journey
and landing money requirements. Section 38(c) empowered the
Cabinet to make orders to
[p]rohibit for a stated period, or permanently, the landing in Canada, or the landing
at any specified port of entry in Canada, of immigrants belonging to any race
deemed unsuited to the climate or requirements of Canada, or of immigrants of any

specified class, occupation or character.

This clause was expanded again in 1919,190 and remained the
legislative basis for a "white Canada" immigration policy for over fifty
years.' 91 While Bc had sought to assert an anti-Asian immigration
policy in legislation and on the basis of a language test with a
transparent racial purpose, the Dominion policy had the advantages,

185 S.C. 1906, c. 19.
186 Sections 26-29 of the Act included the following prohibited classes of immigrants:
"feebleminded" persons, "idiots," "epileptics," and "insane" persons; persons infected with a
"contagious disease"; "paupers" and persons convicted of "crimes of moral turpitude."
187 Sections 32-33.
188 Sections 6-7 & 31.
189 S.C. 1910, c. 27.
190 An Act to Amend The ImmigradonAct, S.C. 1919, c. 25, s. 13.
191 Hawldns, supra, note 62 at 17.
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from a diplomatic point of view, of relative subtlety and discreetness.
Apart from the Chinese ImmigrationAct, federal restrictions prior to
the First World War were not based on racial grounds, and they
were embodied in executive orders and diplomatic arrangements
rather than in legislation. A 1910 American study accurately
summed up the value of the new regulatory scheme to the
Dominion government:
The Canadian immigration law is admirably adapted to carrying out the immigration
policy of the Dominion. Under its terms no immigrants are specifically denied
admission solely because of their race or origin, or because of the purpose for
which they have come to Canada, but the discretion conferred upon officials
charged with the administration of the law does make discrimination entirely
possible. With this discretionary authority Canadian officials are able to regulate
according to the demand for immigrant labour in the
the admission of immigrants
92
Dominion at the time.

As a result of the flexible structure of administration and
executive rule-making put in place by the 1906 and 1910
Immigration Acts, there was no longer any reason for anti-Asian
sentiment in BC to be expressed by the passage of provincial
immigration legislation. Provincial and federal policies were now
united in opposing further Asian immigration. There was no need
for the BC government to augment federal rules or to pass
legislation to draw Ottawa's attention to BC voters' demands for
Asian exclusion. Moreover, after 1906, the courts had made it clear
that any BC immigration legislation would be inoperative as a result
of federal paramountcy. For these reasons, constitutional conflict
over Asian immigration to BC receded after 1908.
IV. CONCLUSION
Constitutional interpretation is never solely a matter of
textual exegesis or the application of judicial precedent; this was
especially true in late nineteenth century Canada, when the judiciary
and the Dominion executive had to embark on an interpretation of
the skeletal language of the Constitution Act, 1867 without the
192
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guidance of judicial precedent or of any meaningful legislative
history 93 A study of this period thus provides an opportunity to
see clearly the values and assumptions that guided the development
of constitutional doctrines that continue to give shape to the division
of powers to this day.
We have seen that, although constitutional jurisdiction over
immigration was shared by the Dominion and the provinces, the
Dominion executive narrowly interpreted the scope of provincial
power to justify the disallowance of Bc anti-Asian immigration laws.
These laws, passed in response to the demands of the Bc white
working class for Asian exclusion, were disallowed in 1884 and 1885
to ensure an adequate supply of labour for construction of the CPR.
From 1900 to 1908, seven further Bc anti-Asian immigration laws
were either disallowed or reserved. When a plentiful supply of
"more desirable" European labour became available after the turn of
the century, the explanation for disallowance shifted from the
Dominion's protection of the domestic labour supply to its desire to
respect the British government's alliance with Japan.
In the second part of this study,194 it is shown that the
Dominion executive also consistently disallowed Bc laws prohibiting
the employment of Asian workers in the province. Disallowance in
this context was justified in part by reference to the theory that the
right of aliens and naturalized subjects to take up employment was
within exclusive federal jurisdiction and thus could not be interfered
with by provincial legislation. This constitutional theory, accepted by
the Privy Council in the Union Colliery Co. v. Bryden 95 case, was
premised on the view that the dominant characteristic ("pith and
substance") of Bc anti-Asian labour laws was the imposition of a
punitive disability on a racial group composed largely of aliens and
naturalized subjects, 196 rather than a bona fide regulation of
193 For a general discussion of the weaknesses of the historical record as a source of
interpretation of the Constitution Act 1867, see K.E. Swinton, The Supreme Court and
CanadianFederalism.. The Laskin-Dickson Years (Toronto: Carswell, 1990) at 89-111.
194 Ryder, supra, note 5.
195 [1899] AC. 580.
196 And thus within federal jurisdiction over "Naturalization and Aliens" (section 91(25)
of the ConstitutionAc

1867).

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[you- 29 No. 3

employment relations in the province.19 7 If Asians were different in
their capacity to work, their exclusion from employment would have
been validly grounded in provincial powers over local workplaces,
akin to exclusions, for example, of women and children from
working in the mines based on assumptions regarding their different
roles and capacities. In other words, the assumption that Asian
workers were no different than European workers in their suitability
for employment underpinned the development of the constitutional
doctrine that placed laws excluding Asians from employment beyond
provincial competence.
Apart from the immigration and labour laws, BC'S laws
imposing disabilities on Chinese and Japanese persons as racial
groups were not disallowed or reserved, with rare exceptions. As is
demonstrated in the concluding part of this study, laws depriving
Asian residents of BC of the vote and of eligibility for public office
were uniformly allowed to stand. Moreover, in a telling twist of
constitutional doctrine, neither the Dominion executive nor the
courts viewed anti-Asian laws as beyond the competence of a
provincial legislature so long as they did not interfere with the right
to enter a province and take up wage labour or effectively drive
Asian residents from the province. In the Cunningham v. Homma 98
and Quong-Wing v. R 19 9 cases, the courts upheld provincial laws
prohibiting Japanese persons from voting and prohibiting Chinese
men from employing white women. If the courts had believed that
Asians were similar to Europeans in their capacity to be responsible
voters or employers, these laws may well have been viewed as ultra
vires attempts to impose punitive disabilities on racial groups
composed largely of aliens and naturalized subjects rather than a
legitimate exercise of provincial jurisdiction over the franchise and
local workplaces. By accepting the validity of assumptions of racial
difference, the judiciary grounded BC anti-Asian laws (other than
labour and immigration laws) within subject matters allocated to

197 And thus not within provincial jurisdiction over "Property and Civil Rights" (section
92(13) of the Constitution Ac, 1867).
198 [1903] A.C 151 (P.C.).
199 (1914), 49 S.C.R. 440.
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provincial legislative jurisdiction by the constitutional division of
powers.
In these ways, the interpretation of the constitutional division
of powers by the Dominion executive and the judiciary was shaped
by assumptions regarding racial similarity and difference. Legal
decision-makers accepted a racist ideology that viewed Asian
immigrants as different from European immigrants ix all respects but
one: their capacity for work. Indeed, Justice Gray's description of
Chinese workers as "living machines"2 o and Prime Minister
MacDonald's statement that a Chinese worker is as valuable as "a
threshing machine or any other agricultural implement '20 1 were
indicative of the prevailing view amongst non-working class white
men that Asians were particularly efficient workers. While nonworking class white men in late nineteenth and early twentieth
century Canada recognized that Asian immigrants, like immigrants of
all other races, were useful as workers, they denied that Asian
immigrants were similar to Europeans in any other respect. In their
view, Asians were a race apart, unable to assimilate into or
participate in the governance of a European-dominated society.
This network of racist assumptions underlay the construction
of constitutional doctrine by the Dominion executive and judiciary.
If BC had been left to its own devices without any interference by
the courts or the Dominion government, by the mid-1880s, Asian
immigration into BC probably would have been prohibited and the
continued residence of Asians already in BC probably would have
been rendered impossible by punitive economic regulation. In
passing these laws, the BC legislature expressed the view of
European working class men in the province that Asian immigrants
were different from and inferior to Europeans in all respects and
thus were undesirable settlers of the province. The pattern of
selective judicial and Dominion executive interference with BC antiAsian laws indicates that legal decision-makers rejected some of the
assumptions of racial difference that were used to rationalize BC's
anti-Asian policies. In particular, the judiciary and the Dominion
executive appeared to accept the view of the capitalist class in BC
200
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that Asians were efficient workers and for this reason, and this
reason alone, were desirable residents of the province.
In essence, then, the constitutional conflict over BC antiAsian legislation was a struggle between European men, divided by
class interests, over the definition of racial difference played out at
the level of federal-provincial politics. In the end, with the
assistance of the Dominion government and the courts, the interests
of the white capitalist class in BC prevailed. The judiciary and the
Dominion executive fashioned a series of constitutional doctrines
which had the effect of preventing BC from interfering with the
rights of Japanese and Chinese to enter the province and work in
low-paying, low-status jobs. Other forms of discrimination against
Asians pursued by Bc did not concern the Dominion government or
the courts, or led to sporadic intervention at best. By this pattern
of selective constitutional invalidation, the courts and the Dominion
government rejected BC's policy of Asian exclusion in favour of a
policy that fostered the exploitation of a segregated and marginal
Asian labour force.

